Marquette Law Review
Volume 79
Issue 2 Winter 1996

Article 2

The Ratings Game: Factors That Influence Judicial
Reputation
William G. Ross

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
Repository Citation
William G. Ross, The Ratings Game: Factors That Influence Judicial Reputation, 79 Marq. L. Rev. 401 (1996).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol79/iss2/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
Volume 79

Winter 1996

Number 2

THE RATINGS GAME: FACTORS THAT
INFLUENCE JUDICIAL REPUTATION
WILLIAM G. ROSS*

INTRODUCTION

The rating of United States Supreme Court justices is an increasingly
favorite pastime among scholars, judges, journalists, students, and
practicing attorneys. Once the domain of a few pundits who made
personal lists of the all-time "greatest" justices,' surveys are becoming
more formal and are embracing more participants. The most extensive

* Professor of Law, Cumberland School of Law of Samford University; A.B., Stanford,
1976; J.D., Harvard, 1979. The author was one of the scholars polled in the 1993 BlausteinMersky survey that is discussed in this Article. The author thanks Professor Roy M. Mersky
of the University of Texas for advice and encouragement in connection with this Article and
for his permission to publish the results of that survey as an appendix to this Article.
1. In 1928, Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes, formerly an associate justice of the
U.S. Supreme Court and later Chief Justice of the United States, made an informal list of the
eight leading Supreme Court justices. CHARLES EVANS HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES 58 (1928). In 1938, Harvard Law School Dean Roscoe Pound compiled
a list of the ten greatest jurists in American history, only four of whom had served on the
Supreme Court. ROSCOE POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN LAW 30-31, n.2
(1938). In 1957, Justice Felix Frankfurter weighed in with his list of the sixteen greatest
Supreme Court justices. Felix Frankfurter, The Supreme Court in the Mirrorof Justices, 105
U. PA. L. REV. 781, 783-84 (1957). The legal scholar John P. Frank presented a list of 23
justices in 1958. JOHN P. FRANK, MARBLE PALACE: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN
LIFE (1958). Wisconsin Chief Justice George R. Currie made a list of the top nine justices
in 1964. George R. Currie, A JudicialAll-Star Nine, 1964 WIS. L. REV. 3, 3-13. Sidney H.
Asch compiled a list of the fifteen greatest justices in 1971, and New York University Law
Professor Bernard Schwartz made a list of the top ten in 1979, SIDNEY H. ASCH, THE
SUPREME COURT AND ITS GREAT JUSTICES (1971); Bernard Schwartz, The Judicial Ten:
America's Greatest Judges, 1979 So. ILL. U. L.J. 405, 405-06. Stuart S. Nagel in 1970 and
James E. Hambleton in 1983 made lists based upon compilations of earlier lists. Stuart S.
Nagel, CharacteristicsofSupreme Court Greatness,56 A.B.A. J. 957-59; James E. Hambleton,
The All-Time All-Star All-Era Supreme Court, 69 A.B.A. J. 462-64 (1983).
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surveys were conducted in 1992 by Professors William D. Pederson and
Norman W Provizer and in 1993 by Professors Roy M. Mersky and the
late Albert P. Blaustein. z Pederson and Provizer compiled four
separate lists for academics, jurists, students, and lawyers, while
Blaustein and Mersky prepared one list based on a poll of more than
one hundred judges, scholars, and lawyers. The Blaustein-Mersky survey
updated a similar survey that these scholars conducted in 1970.
Although all of these lists have some predictable similarities, there are
also some striking differences that offer significant insights into how the
perception of what constitutes judicial greatness shifts with time and
diverges according to who does the ranking.
Although the ranking of Supreme Court justices may sometimes
seem like a parlor game, it is a useful exercise insofar as it offers a
means of defining the qualities that Americans value in their Supreme
Court justices. The identification of such qualities is of both retrospective and prospective use. Retrospectively, the evaluation of justices
offers insights into legal history since distinctions among the relative
significance of various judges provide a clearer perspective about which
judicial decisions and philosophies have most profoundly influenced the
Court and the country. In this manner, it assists the historian in her
essential task of distinguishing between phenomena and ephemera. It
also offers significant insights into historiography, since shifts in judicial
reputation over the years reflect changing attitudes toward the work of
the Court during various periods of history. Prospectively, the
evaluation of justices helps us to discriminate among possible candidates
for service on the Court and to predict how potential or new justices will
behave while on the bench? An understanding of what makes judicial
greatness is particularly important since the work of the Supreme Court
is so subjective and has such a profound impact on the life of the
nation4
2.

See

WILLIAM D. PEDERSON & NORMAN W. PROVIZER, GREAT JUSTICES OF THE

U.S. SUPREME COURT: RATINGS AND CASES 14-19 (1993); list compiled by Roy M. Mersky
and Albert P. Blaustein (Attached to this Article as Appendix I). The scope of the two
surveys is substantially different. Professors Pederson and Provizer asked members of their
four groups of participants to list the ten greatest justices. Professors Mersky and Blaustein
sought rankings of all of the 108 justices who had served on the Court. Professors Blaustein
and Mersky conducted a similar survey in 1970. See Albert P. Blaustein & Roy M. Mersky,
Rating Supreme Court Justices, 58 A.B.A. J. 1185 (1972); See also Appendix II.
3.

HENRY ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF APPOINT-

(2d ed. 1985).
4. As Professor Fairman observed, the Justices always are "at work on the all-embracing
question, 'What sort of country is America to be-what shall be the characteristics of its
MENTS TO THE SUPREME COURT 11
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The evaluation of Supreme Court justices is obviously far from an
exact science. Everyone who participates in surveys on judicial greatness
or has an opinion about the respective merits of justices applies
somewhat different criteria in evaluating the justices, and any opinion or
ranking is inherently subjective.5 As we shall see, the reputations of
some justices have fluctuated widely, varying according to the temper of
the times and the predilections of the persons who have conducted the
surveys. But while there is no precise or objective means of evaluating
justices, the rankings of justices have had certain consistencies. Literally
every published survey has ranked John Marshall as the "greatest"
justice, and other justices, particularly Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. and
Louis D. Brandeis, have generally fared well.
Despite differing results in various surveys, however, there are
certain factors which are likely to influence any judicial reputation. The
participants in the 1993 Pederson-Provizer survey listed the following
factors: leadership on the Court, writing ability, judicial restraint, judicial
activism, enhancement of the Court's power, protection of individual
rights, length of service, impact on the law, impact on society, intellectual and legal ability, protection of societal rights, dissent behavior, and
personal attributes.6 Similar factors are likely to have been considered
in other surveys and in other evaluations of the justices.7
economy, what shall be the qualities of the people's liberty, where within this federal system
shall various responsibilities be exercised?' On these, the ultimate problems, the Constitution
speaks with Delphic reticence; it is actually the Justices that pronounce the responses. No
other country gives so much authority to its supreme judiciary. That is why we hear so much
popular discussion of the personalities on our Supreme Court. That is why it seems worth
while ... to seek in the Court's history an answer to the question, 'What makes a great
Justice?'

Charles Fairman, What Makes A Great Justice? Mr. Justice Bradley and the

Supreme Court, 1870-1892, 30 B.U. L. REV. 68 (1950). Not everyone would agree with this
assessment, however. Professor Ariens recently argued that "[t]he romantic notion of the
Great Judge... is dangerously misleading" because the Court's decisions are not important
since their effect depends so heavily upon those who must implement the decisions and the
obedience of the citizenry. According to Ariens, "any symbolic guidance on Great Judges for
legal and moral guidance means that less is required of us as members of a community."
Michael S. Ariens, ConstitutionalLaw and the Myth of the GreatJudge, 25 ST. MARY'S L.J.
303, 312-13 (1993).
5. As Felix Frankfurter observed, "[g]reatness in the law is not a standardized quality,
nor are the elements that combine to attain it." Felix Frankfurter, The Supreme Court in the
Mirrorof Justices, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 781, 784 (1957).
6. PEDERSON & PROVIZER, supra note 2, at 19.

7. Professor Abraham recently listed the following factors, in no particular order of
importance: "(1) Demonstrated judicial temperament; (2) professional expertise and
competence, including analytical powers; (3) absolute personal moral and professional
integrity; (4) an able, agile, lucid mind; (5) appropriate professional educational background
or training; (6) the ability to communicate clearly, both orally and in writing, and especially
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Some of these factors obviously influence some critics more than
others, and some factors-activism and restraint, for example-may be
mutually contradictory. Moreover, these factors are more useful in
framing a theoretical model of an ideal justice rather than identifying the
factors that actually mold judicial reputation in practice. This Article
will consider the impact of factors that seem most likely to have
influenced the rankings of justices. The influence of these factors can
be discerned from determining how various justices have fared in the
surveys and in other studies of the justices and constitutional history.
IMPACT ON LEGAL DEVELOPMENT: THE VISION FACTOR

The most fair and rational factor-and perhaps the most important
element-that influences judicial reputation is the extent to which a
justice helps to forge the law. Since Supreme Court justices, unlike most
other judges, are not required to follow the precedents of higher courts
and regularly decide difficult cases about the law, Supreme Court
justices obviously have a greater opportunity than do other judges to
influence the development of the law. Justices leave their mark not only
upon future generations of judges, but also upon future generations of
all Americans since their decisions so profoundly affect social, political,
and economic issues that touch everyone.
The greatest of judicial decisions-and the judges that authored
them-should be measured more by their long-term influence than by
their actual durability. Accordingly, Richard A. Posner aptly contends
that a judge's reputation should be measured not so much in terms of
"the 'rightness' of his decisions as judged by the test of time" since
"[m]ost judicial decisions, even of the agreed-to-be-the-greatest judges

the latter-in other words, craftsmanship and technique; (7) resolute fair-mindedness and
impartiality; (8) a solid understanding of the proper judicial role of judges under our written
Constitution; (9) diligence and industry; (10) on-Court leadership ability." Henry J. Abraham,
Preface to PEDERSON & PROVIZER, supra note 2, at xvii-xviii. Professors Blaustein and
Mersky reported that the experts that they consulted for their 1970 survey "found that success
on the Supreme Court was the result of several qualities in combination: scholarship; legal
learning and analytical powers; craftsmanship and technique; wide general knowledge and
learning; character, moral integrity and impartiality; diligence and industry; the ability to
express oneself with clarity, logic and compelling force; openness to change; courage to take
unpopular positions; dedication to the Court as an institution and to the office of Supreme
Court justice; ability to carry a proportionate share of the Court's responsibility in opinion
writing; and finally, the quality of statesmanship." ALBERT P. BLAUSTEIN & ROY M.
MERSKY, THE FIRST ONE HUNDRED JUSTICES: STATISTICAL STUDIES ON THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 50-51 (1978).

1996]

THE RATINGS GAME

usually are superseded and in that sense eventually proved
'wrong.' 8 Judge Posner contends that "the test of greatness for the
substance of judicial decisions, therefore, should be, as in the case of
science, the contribution that the decisions make to the development of
legal rules and principles rather than whether the decision is a 'classic'
having the permanence and perfection of a work of art." 9 Posner
believes that the extent to which a judge is cited by other judges is a
valid index of his influence and therefore, of his greatness.'0
The greatest justices have developed legal principles that have
endured the test of time even though-or perhaps because-future
generations have refined and adapted those principles to their changing
needs. The highly rated Holmes, Brandeis, and Stone, for example, are
revered as pioneers of civil liberties even though many of the principles
that they enunciated are no longer "good law." In addition to encouraging judicial activism in the area of civil liberties, the same trio of justices
were instrumental in the development of legal doctrines that eventually
helped to persuade the Supreme Court to abandon its careful scrutiny
of economic legislation."
John Marshall's consistent ranking of first in surveys on judicial
greatness clearly reflect his monumental decisions expanding the power
of the Supreme Court and the federal government and fostering
economic development. The high ratings that Joseph Story receives
likewise reflect Story's significant contributions to the strengthening of
the federal government and the nation's economy. And, of course, Earl
Warren's high rankings reflects his major role in so many decisions in
which the Supreme Court expanded civil liberties in the areas of race,
religion, freedom of expression, voting, and criminal justice.
...

IDEOLOGY: THE POLITICAL CORRECTNESS FACTOR

Since the work of the Court is inextricably related to politics, the
political predilections of the persons who evaluate the justices inevitably
influence their rankings. Moreover, since the decisions of the justices so
profoundly affect the political life of the nation, the political orientation
8. Richard A. Posner, The Learned Hand Biography and the Question of Judicial
Greatness, 104 YALE L. J. 511, 523 (1994).
9. Id.
10. Id at 534-35; RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOzO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 80-91
(1990). Posner acknowledges that this is not "the only method" of evaluating judicial
greatness and that it "has no pretension to infallibility." Posner, supra note 8, at 534.
11. See, e.g. G. Edward White, The Canonizationof Holmes and Brandeis: Epistemology
and JudicialReputations, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 576, 578-85 (1995).
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of justices is a legitimate criterion for evaluating judicial greatness. If,
for example, an evaluator believes that significant economic inequalities
exist in American society and that the Constitution provides a means for
mitigating such inequalities, the evaluator may fairly boost the ranking
of a justice who has found creative ways to use the Constitution to
remedy such inequalities, even if his or her views have not been
accepted by the Court. 2
Since most leading scholars favor judicial deference to the legislative
branch of government in economic matters and judicial activism in cases
involving personal liberties, it is not surprising that so-called "liberal"
justices are more highly ranked than what might be called "conservative" justices. Since 1937, when the Court has used its power primarily
for the protection of personal rather than economic liberties, liberals
have tended to favor a strong Court and also have traditionally favored
the assertion of federal power at the expense of the states. The
Pederson-Provizer list of the top ten justices reads like an honor role of
liberal heroes: John Marshall, who laid the foundations for a powerful
Court and federal government; Holmes and Brandeis, who railed against
substantive economic due process and wrote eloquent dissents in favor
of free speech; and Warren, Brennan, Black, and Douglas, who
expanded the scope of civil liberties and espoused judicial activism on
behalf of embattled minorities. Similarly, the 1970 and 1993 BlausteinMersky lists place civil libertarians and judicial activists (in noneconomic cases) at the top of the lists and tend to assign to the bottom
those justices who opposed economic regulatory legislation and civil
libertarianism. For example, three of the so-called "Four Horsemen of
the Apocalypse" who opposed New Deal legislation-Butler, McReynolds, and Van Devanter-are listed as "Failures" in both studies. This
ranking almost certainly reflects the political predilections of the
participants in the survey since all of these justices served for long
tenures and were highly influential.13 The "failure" ratings of Harold
12. As one study of such rankings has argued, "[t]he problem is not that political bias
improperly distorted the evaluations, but that political bias inevitably and properly affects
evaluations of justices .... We need to remind ourselves that justices are not merely opinionwriters; they also vote." David P. Bryden & E. Christine Flaherty, The "Human Resumes" of
Great Supreme Court Justices,75 MINN. L. REv. 635, 662 (1991).
13. Professor Langran has observed that "Justice Butler's rating as a failure was based
entirely upon his conservative approach to cases before the Court. Perhaps he was insensitive
to matters of civil liberties, but one wonders if that alone should be enough to brand him as
a failure as a justice." Robert W. Langran, Why Are Some Supreme Court Justices Rated as
"Failures"?,in YEARBOOK SUPREME COURT HISTORICAL SOCIETY 11 (1985). Similarly,
Langran concludes that "Van Devanter should not have been rated a failure" but that the
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H. Burton, Fred M. Vinson, and Sherman Minton in the 1970 BlausteinMersky survey and the undistinguished rankings of those same justices
in the 1993 update also may reflect distaste for their conservatism on
social questions. 4 Likewise, the low ranking of Warren E. Burger, who
placed eighty-sixth in the 1993 Blaustein-Mersky survey despite his
obvious influence and relatively long tenure, may reflect distaste for
Burger's political predilections as much as frustration over the perception that he failed to offer effective leadership as chief justice. Finally,
it is difficult to use any measure other than politics to account for the
very low ranking of Clarence Thomas, who placed third from the bottom
in the 1993 Blaustein-Mersky survey, even though his service of less than
two years on the Court provided little basis for any ranking.
The possible influence of political considerations are demonstrated
in the disparities between the lists of scholars and attorneys. Lawyers,
who may be presumed to be more conservative than academics, ranked
Taney, Story, and Rehnquist among the top ten justices in the PedersonProvizer survey. These justices were not among the top ten justices in
their survey of scholars. Scholars in that survey, however, placed
Brennan among the top ten even though he was not among the top ten
ranked by attorneys. Another intriguing contrast between the lists is that
attorneys picked the relatively "conservative" Harlan II as one of the
top ten justices, while scholars selected the "liberal" Harlan I. And
Frankfurter, who ranked fifth among lawyers, placed ninth among
scholars. It is difficult to conclude that the markedly more "conservative" tilt of the attorneys' survey does not reflect differences in the
political outlook of the respondents.' 5
The 1993 Blaustein-Mersky list lends additional support to this
conclusion. In that survey, which included lawyers, judges, and
academicians, Story ranked fourth but Taney placed twenty-ninth and
Rehnquist forty-eighth. Harlan I outranked Harlan II, Brennan ranked
seventh, and Frankfurter placed fourteenth.
"Political correctness," however, does not assure a high ranking, and
"incorrectness" does not necessarily assure a low ranking. Although
Thurgood Marshall is widely and properly revered for his unique preverdict on McReynolds "might be proper if considering this ultra-conservativeness with his
inability to blend in with the other justices in a body which is supposed to be collegial ... was
the cause of his being rated a failure." Id. at 9, 10.
14. Id. at 11-14.
15. In the 1993 Blaustein-Mersky survey, which surveyed a range of academicians,
judges, and attorneys, Story placed fourth, but Taney ranked twenty-ninth and Rehnquist
forty-eighth.
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Court career and his unflagging devotion to liberal ideals while on the
Court, he was placed at the bottom of the "average" category in the
1970 Blaustein-Mersky survey, rose no higher than seventeenth in their
1993 survey, and did not join his liberal brethren in the PedersonProvizer top-ten lists of scholars, judges, and attorneys. 6

Conversely, Stephen J. Field appeared among the "near greats" in
the 1970 and 1993 Blaustein-Mersky surveys 7 and was rated tenth in
a 1958 list compiled by John P. Frank, who surely would differ with
Field on many key issues. Since few respondents to the Blaustein and
Mersky surveys were likely to have been sympathetic to the judicial
views of this architect of substantive economic due process, Fields's
relatively high ranking is a tribute to his pervasive influence and his
powers of intellect.'"
Similarly, Joseph P. Bradley received high
rankings in the 1970 and 1993 Blaustein-Mersky surveys (seventeenth
and twenty-first, respectively) even though he also espoused what most
scholars today would regard as an unduly narrow view of the constitutional scope of governmental regulation; although he was sometimes
more amenable to such regulation than were some of his colleagues on
the Court.
Frankfurter's ranking as fourteenth in the 1993 Blaustein-Mersky
survey further demonstrates that a justice who espouses "conservative"
views on the Court is not necessarily barred from the higher echelons.
This ranking, however, is not so high as we might expect for a justice
who served so long and expressed his views so brilliantly and forcefully.
One suspects that Frankfurter might have joined the pantheon of the
"great" justices if he had more frequently supported the great civil
libertarian decisions of his day and that he might have fallen further if
he had not so frequently voted in favor of such decisions and had not
been so closely identified with liberal causes during his pre-Court career.
Conversely, Frankfurter's rating may be helped by a trend among
16. Thurgood Marshall ranked ninth in the Pederson-Provizer survey of students.
PEDERSON & PROVIZER, supranote 2. In the 1993 Blaustein-Mersky survey, Marshall ranked
seventeenth, a great improvement from their 1970 survey but still far below his liberal
brethren. Blaustein & Mersky, supra note 2.
17. Field ranked sixteenth in both surveys. Blaustein & Mersky, supra note 2.
18. As Professor Atkinson has observed, "[m]ost would agree that Stephen J. Field, by
virtue of the tenacity and force with which he held to his conclusions and pressed his point
of view for 34 years, is entitled to a place of preeminence in Supreme Court history. Not only
did he participate in hundreds of major decisions, but he elaborated his views in the detail
permitted only by long service. The duration of his tenure as well as his strength of mind
made him influential." David N. Atkinson, Minor Supreme CourtJustices: Their Characteristics and Importance, 3 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 348, 349 (1975).
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academics and judges to admire judicial restraint, although Frankfurter
fell from eleventh in the 1970 survey.
The primary hero of the judicial restraint renaissance, however, is
not Frankfurter but rather Harlan II, who has been the subject of much
admiring attention during recent years on the Court and in academia. 9
The emergence of what one commentator has called a "cult of Harlan"' may explain why Harlan's ranking vaulted from twenty-fifth to
tenth between 1970 and 1993 in the Blaustein-Mersky survey. Harlan's
newfound popularity, however, is based at least in part upon respect for
his intellectual and professional integrity rather than agreement with his
specific opinions, many of which may conflict with the views of his
acolytes.
Further evidence that political predilections are not dispositive in the
ratings is provided by the relative rankings of Lewis E Powell and Harry
Blackmun. Although the moderate Powell served for only fifteen years,
he ranked twenty-second in the 1993 Blaustein-Mersky survey while the
more liberal Blackmun, who had served for twenty-three years, ranked
only twenty-fourth.
Moreover, there are reasons other than ideology to explain the
rankings of most justices. As we shall see below, most of the "great"
justices were characterized by long tenure, leadership, literary skills,
influence, and other factors that cannot be explained by ideology.
Literally all of the top twenty justices in the 1993 Blaustein-Mersky
survey had most if not all of these attributes. Most of the low ranked
justices lacked some or most of these qualities. Only a handful of
justices in the bottom fifty of the 1993 Blaustein-Mersky survey-notably
Burger, Henry B. Brown, Burton, William R. Day, Vinson, Van
Devanter, Butler, and McReynolds-served long and influentially
enough that they could remotely merit placement among the upper half
of the justices. Although it is unlikely that more conservative evaluators
would place these few justices among the top twenty, more conservative
evaluators might rescue them from the lower half.
Perhaps the principal common ideological denominator in judicial
rankings is what Professors Blaustein and Mersky have called judicial
"statesmanship," which they define as "an understanding of the nature

19. See CentennialConference in HonorofJusticeJohn MarshallHarlan,36 N.Y.L. SCH.
L. REV. 1-286 (1991); TINSLEY E. YARBROUGH, JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN: GREAT
DISSENTER OF THE WARREN COURT (1992); Jeffrey Rosen, Poetic Justice, NEW REPUBLIC,

Mar. 8, 1993, at 26-27.
20. Rosen, supra note 19, at 26.
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of the American governmental system as a continuing experiment in
democracy and an understanding of the special role of the Court in
conducting that experiment., 21 In applying this subtle concept, one
could argue that all of the highly ranked justices had a keen appreciation
of the historical role of the Court as a guardian of personal and property
rights and a sophisticated vision of the Court's relationship to the
President, Congress, the state governments, and public opinion.
Different justices interpreted this role in different manners at different
times-Marshall and Warren, for example, expounded judicial activism
while Holmes and Frankfurter advocated judicial restraint-but all
"great" justices shared a common comprehension of the Court's delicate
but important position in American life. Many and perhaps most of the
judges who are not ranked as great may also have shared this understanding, but they were less successful in articulating it or did not serve
long enough to clearly mark the Court with their own peculiar version
of this vision.
The concept of "statesmanship," however, is not free from ideological content, since some of the poorly ranked judges also adhered to a
distinct vision of the role of the Court in American society. The Four
Horsemen, for example, all embraced a clearly defined and coherent
philosophy. Those who evaluate the justices have concluded that these
justices were flawed in their vision since many of their decisions
impeded economic reform that has stood the test of time and thwarted
the development of civil liberties that are now generally accepted as
fundamental. Moreover, the Court's powers almost surely would have
been curtailed if the views of these justices had continued to prevail.
Although the rejection of constitutional values that are generally
accepted today and the jeopardizing of the Court's powers would seem
to justify the determination that these justices lacked "statesmanship,"
this conclusion is not without ideological content since one who agreed
with the content of their decisions might argue that they were statesmanlike for courageously defending correct constitutional doctrines in the
face of formidable public and political opposition.
As notions of what constitutes "statesmanship" shifts with the
ideological trends, the rankings of justices are bound to change. Even
the most revered justices are not immune to corresponding declines in
their reputations. Mark V. Tushnet recently pointed out, "if there is a
phenomena of decanonization and the process is tied to backing the

21. BLAUSTEIN & MERSKY, supra note 7, at 51.
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wrong horse, we may soon see interesting things happening with respect
Holmes, who may turn out now to
to the reputations of Brandeis 2and
2
have backed the wrong horse.1
LONGEVITY OF TENURE: THE GERIATRIC FACTOR

The most striking common denominator among highly ranked
justices on the lists is longevity of service. The Pederson-Provizer list
includes five of the seven justices who have served for more than thirty
years. Only Field and Story are absent. Similarly, the top ten justices
in Blaustein and Mersky's 1970 survey included six of the fourteen
justices who had served for longer than 28 years and their top ten in
1993 included six of the fifteen who had served that long.' The link
between longevity of service and reputation is not accidental. The
greatness of most justices would be considerably diminished if their
tenure had been cut in half
For example, if John Marshall had served for 17 years rather than 34,
24 Dartmouth
he would not have decided McCulloch v. Maryland,
26
College v. Woodward,' or Gibbons v. Ogden.
Although he still
might be ranked as "great" for enhancing the power of the federal
government and the Supreme Court, he would not be remembered for
providing a firm legal foundation for expanding capitalism. Similarly, if
Earl Warren had served for eight years rather than sixteen, he would not
have participated in the landmark decisions concerning re-apportionment, criminal procedure, and the freedom of speech, religion, and press
that marked the second half of his tenure. Although his contributions
to the civil rights decisions of the 1950s would assure him an honored
position in history, it is unlikely that he would appear on any list of the
top ten justices. Likewise, if Holmes had served only half of his 29
years, he would not have participated in any of the free speech decisions
that form a major part of his reputation.
It is significant that Brennan's ranking rose from twenty-sixth in the
1970 Blaustein-Mersky survey, when Brennan had served only fourteen
22. TranscriptBiographiesof Titans:Holmes, Brandeis,and Other Obsessions,70 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 677, 693 (1995).
23. BLAUSTEiN & MERSKY, supra note 7, at 37; BLAUSTEIN & MERSKY, supra note 2.
Both lists included Marshall (34 years); Holmes (29 years); Story (34 years); Black (33 years
as of 1970 and 34 as of 1993); and John Marshall Harlan 1 (34 years). The 1970 list included
Taney (28 years) and the 1993 list included Brennan (33 years).
24. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
25. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
26. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
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years, to fifth in the 1993 Pederson-Provizer survey and seventh in the
1993 Blaustein-Mersky survey, when Brennan had retired after thirtyfour years. Brennan's devotion to civil liberties, his intellectual powers,
and his influence on his brethren already were apparent by 1970 and he
already had participated in and written many landmark decisions by
then. During the following two decades, however, Brennan had the
opportunity to participate in many more significant decisions. Perhaps
more importantly, however, Brennan during those years exercised a
quiet but arguably profound influence on his more conservative
colleagues and, when this influence failed to produce a majority, he
wrote dissents that powerfully articulated the liberal position.
Longevity of service also may account for the substantial rise in the
rankings of Justices Thurgood Marshall, Potter Stewart, and Byron R.
White between 1970 and 1993 in the Blaustein-Mersky survey. Marshall
rose from eighty-second to seventeenth as his number of years of service
increased from three to twenty-four. Stewart, whose years of service
increased from twelve to twenty-three, rose from seventy-ninth to
twenty-eighth in the rankings. White rose from eightieth to forty-first
as his years of service increased from eight to thirty-one. Like Brennan,
Marshall gained respect for his dissents in so many cases during the
Burger-Rehnquist eras while Stewart and White may have been
recognized as pivotal figures in many of the closely divided decisions of
this period.
The only "great" justice whose tenure was short is Cardozo, and he
is the exception that proves the rule. Although scholars agree that
Cardozo made major contributions during his mere six years on the
Court, Cardozo's high ranking surely is influenced by his brilliant
reputation during his eighteen years on the New York Court of Appeals.
Cardozo is the only justice who would rank among the nation's "great"
judges even if he had not served on the Court. Without his service on
the New York court, however, it is unlikely that Cardozo would be
widely viewed as a "great" justice.
Conversely, the only long-serving justices with low rankings are Van
Devanter and McReynolds, both of whom served for 27 years. The
reputations of both justices, as we have seen, are marred by their
hostility toward economic regulation. Indeed, shorter tenures might
have spared them from the "failure" ranking since so much of their
notoriety is the result of their opposition to New Deal legislation near
the end of their years on the Court.
A long tenure also seems to boost the rankings of otherwise
mediocre justices. Thomas Todd, for example, was frequently absent
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from the Court and did so little to influence the great decisions of the
Marshall Court (for which he generally voted) that Frank H. Easterbrook has wryly called him "the most insignificant justice."'2 7 His
ranking among the higher echelons of the "average" category in the
1970 Blaustein-Mersky survey and his only slightly lower showing in
their 1993 survey may reflect the fact that he served for a lengthy period
(nineteen years) during stirring times. Similarly, the relatively long
tenure of John McKinley may explain why this justice, who made few
contributions during his fifteen years on the Court, placed near the top
of the "average" category in the 1970 Blaustein-Mersky survey and clung
to an average rating in the 1993 update.
Short tenure naturally tends to depress rankings. It is perhaps no
accident that the talented James Byrnes, who served for only one year,
is ranked fifth from the bottom in the 1970 and 1993 Blaustein-Mersky
surveys, and perhaps it was unfair to rank him at all. It is likely that
other bright and able persons, particularly Fortas, Goldberg, Jackson,
and Wiley B. Rutledge, would have received higher rankings-perhaps
8
even as "greats"-if their tenures had not been cut short.
Longevity of tenure is virtually a prerequisite for judicial
greatness insofar as the work of a judge is plodding and incremental.
Although justices may be remembered for bold opinions and occasional
dashes of genius, sudden innovations are contrary to the spirit of the
judicial process. Landmark decisions are nearly always merely the
culmination of slow changes that already occurred on both the Supreme
Court and lower courts. The classic example is Brown v. Board of
Education,9 which was a coup de grace rather than a bolt from the
blue. A great justice is not one who hands down a few revolutionary
decisions and then departs from the scene, but rather one who participates over a long period of time in legal developments that eventually
culminate in major changes in the law. Similarly, the reputations of
most justices are based upon a lengthy series of decisions rather than a
few dramatic decisions that are handed down during a brief period.
For example, the "great" Black and Douglas are remembered more
because of their commitment to civil liberties in countless cases

27. Frank H. Easterbrook, The Most InsignificantJustice, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 481, 496
(1983).
28. In the 1993 Blaustein and Mersky survey, Fortas ranked sixty-fourth, Goldberg
placed fiftieth, Jackson was fifteenth, and Rutledge ranked thirty-fifth. Blaustein & Mersky,
supra note 2.
29. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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stretching over a third of a century than because of anything they said
or did in any particular case. Even when a justice's reputation is based
in large part on a famous vote or an epigrammatic observation, an
examination of the justice's entire record is likely to reveal a substantial
commitment to the ideals expressed in such vote or opinion. Although
Harlan I's reputation is based in large measure upon his dissent in Plessy
v. Ferguson,'° that dissent was merely the most notable example of
Harlan's steadfast devotion to the rights of African Americans during his
34 year tenure on the Court, a commitment that was evident in many
lesser known or almost forgotten decisions.
INTELLECTUAL ABILITY: THE EGGHEAD FACTOR

Intellectual vigor is virtually a pre-requisite for judicial greatness.
Virtually all of the justices have been highly intelligent and learned
persons. Even most of the lesser justices, in contrast to most middling
politicians, have enjoyed a surprisingly wide-ranging life of the mind and
too often have been unfairly dismissed as intellectual philistines.
Relatively few justices, however, have been systematic scholars of the
law or have made significant and original contributions to legal thought,
and a disproportionate share of these justices rank among the "greats."
Three of the top fourteen justices on the 1970 and 1993 BlausteinMersky lists-Story, Holmes, and Cardozo-made original contributions
to legal thought before serving on the Court. Two others, Frankfurter
and Stone, were longtime law school professors and at least two
more-Brandeis and Black-were serious legal thinkers. Another highly
ranked justice, Douglas, taught at Yale and Columbia and pursued a
wide range of intellectual activities. The erudition of Bradley may
account for the relatively high ranking of this relatively obscure justice
in the 1970 and 1993 Blaustein-Mersky surveys. Similarly, virtually all
of the judges on Roscoe Pound's 1938 list of the ten greatest American
judges were intellectuals,3' as were most of the ten judges that Bernard
Schwartz ranked as the greatest in 1979.32
In contrast, the lower echelons of the survey are studded with
justices who were brilliant lawyers in their day but were not known for
their interest in timeless ideas and who made no original contributions
to legal thought even though they may have had a taste or even a talent

30. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
31. POuND, supra note 1, at 4, 30-31.
32. Schwartz, supra note 1, at 405-06.
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for philosophy, literature, or music. Fortas and Van Devanter are
examples. Of course, many other lower ranked justices are notable
more for political pluck or luck than for any legal talents, much less
intellectual interests. Minton and Whittaker, who ranked as the worst
"failures" in the 1970 Blaustein-Mersky survey, would be examples.
Even though most of the less than "great" justices were highly learned
persons, none made any notable contributions to legal thought.
Moreover, only a handful-Jackson and Wiley B. Rutledge are the most
notable exceptions-were even marginally engaged in the intellectual life
of their generation.
Intellectuality helps to make a "great" justice inasmuch as we have
seen that the greatest justices have been deeply concerned with the
fundamental questions of human liberty and have contributed to the
growth of legal thought. Great lawyers often do not make great justices
because they are so trained in the ability to manipulate technicalities, so
wedded to precedent, and so accustomed to accommodating themselves
to the needs of clients that they are unable to achieve the intellectual
creativity and catholicity that is an essential ingredient in judicial
greatness. As Professor Atkinson has pointed out, a great justice "must
be able to deal with constitutional issues with imagination and with a
sense of their current importance to the public. There must be an
awareness, partly intuitive, partly a product of education,33 of the larger
values sometimes only implicitly suggested in litigation.
This is why Learned Hand believed that a judge who decided
constitutional questions should "have at least a bowing acquaintance"
with the great classics of Western philosophy and literature and that
only a liberal education would enable Americans "to meet and master
the high-power salesman of political patent medicines." 4 The profound erudition of men such as Story, Holmes, Brandeis, Black, and
Frankfurter helped to make them great justices inasmuch as it imbued
them with a vision that transcended the political fashions and fevers of
the moment. It is no accident that Holmes, who is ranked as the second
greatest justice in both the Pederson-Provizer survey and the 1993
Blaustein-Mersky survey, had a dazzlingly cultivated mind that is
revealed in his correspondence with such intellectuals as Harold Laski,
Lewis Einstein, and Frederick Pollock." Justice Black recognized the
33. Atkinson, supra note 18, at 352.
34. Learned Hand, Sources of Tolerance, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 12 (1930).
35. See HOLMES-POLLOCK LETrERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JusTICE HOLMES
AND SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK, 1874-1932 (Mark D. Howe, ed., 1941); HOLMES-LASKI

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79:401

importance of erudition when he established a vigorous lifelong regimen
of study of the great works of Western civilization after he became a
Justice.36 Such breadth of intellect is particularly likely to produce
judicial greatness when it is joined with a technical proficiency that
37
informs rather than stifles creativity.
Intellectuality, however, may hinder the type of boldness that is the
hallmark of several of the very greatest justices. While the greatest
justices have been disproportionately intellectual, two of the three most
esteemed justices on the Pederson-Provizer list-John Marshall and Earl
Warren-were not particularly intellectual. Both were more men of
action than men of letters, and both acted boldly and shrewdly to
expand the power of the federal government and the Court. While
more intellectual than Marshall or Warren, Brandeis also belongs in the
category of justices who were more public men than scholars. In all
three instances, a relative lack of intellectuality may have contributed to
a "great" reputation insofar as these justices often were willing to
disregard legal doctrine in reaching decisions that had far-reaching
political implications. More scholarly justices might have had difficulty
justifying the results of decisions that departed from established
precedent and that sometimes were arguably more the results of political
predilections than legal reasoning. It is perhaps no accident that
Frankfurter, the most "intellectual" member of the Warren Court, often
dissented from the more creative products of Warren Court jurisprudence. Another highly ranked intellectual-justice, Holmes, made his
reputation primarily as an apostle of judicial restraint. Although many
present-day scholars share their reservations about judicial activism,
scholars, like non-scholars, ranked Marshall first and Warren third in the
Pederson-Provizer survey.
Intellectuality may also contribute to the reputation of justices to the
extent that intellectuals and academicians write most judicial biographies
and are disproportionately represented among participants in the
LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND HAROLD J. LASKI (Mark
D. Howe, ed., 1953); HOLMES-EINSTEIN LETTERS: CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE

HOLMES AND LEWIS EINSTEIN 1903-1935 (James B. Peabody ed., 1964).
36. See DANIEL J. MEADOR, MR. JUSTICE BLACK AND His BOOKS (1974).
37. As Justice Frankfurter once observed, Holmes. Hughes, Brandeis, and Cardozo all
"had the largeness of view so essential for adjudicating the great issues before the Court. But
is it just a coincidence that all four were to a superlative degree technically equipped lawyers?
They built on that equipment for the larger tasks of the Court; they were not confined by it.
Again, is it mere coincidence that all four were widely read and deeply cultivated men whose
reading and cultivation gave breadth and depth to their understanding of legal problems and
infused their opinions?" Frankfurter, supra note 1, at 794-95.
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rankings of justices. As one study of judicial reputation wryly observed,
"[i]t should come as no surprise that the kind of justice whose performance pleases professors turns out to have a background, on average,
which bears an uncanny resemblance to that of many of the best
professors."38 Such a bias, however, is not immediately apparent in the
Pederson-Provizer survey, in which "intellectual" judges, including
former academicians, fare at least as well among lawyers as among
scholars. Holmes, Brandeis, Douglas, Frankfurter, and Cardozo appear
on both lists, but the lawyers give higher rankings to all of these justices
except Holmes (who places second on both lists), and also include
Rehnquist and Joseph Story, the erudite legal commentator and savior
of the Harvard Law School. Although one might expect the student list
to reflect the views of the scholars or favor the intellectual judges whose
opinions are emphasized in law schools, the student top ten list included
only one bona fide intellectual-Holmes-and one quasi-intellectual,
Rehnquist.
Although scholars tend to reward intellectuality in justices, their
definition of intellectuality may be rather narrow since it is based largely
upon a justice's contribution to the great public issues of his day.
Although most of the justices who have made major contributions to
such issues also have had the interest and ability to carry their load of
the Court's more mundane work, it is unlikely that technical ability
alone would enable one to achieve judicial greatness. Intellectual ability
on narrow issues may help to raise a justice's rankings marginally,
although it will do little to save the reputation of a justice whose
ideology is regarded as offensive. For example, Van Devanter was an
able judicial technician who made important contributions in areas such
as natural resources law in which his impatient colleagues deferred to his
daedal craftsmanship. Neither technique nor contribution, however,
rescued this advocate of economic due process from the "Failure"
categories in the 1970 and 1993 Blaustein-Mersky surveys.
PRE-COURT AND POST-COURT CAREERS: THE CELEBRITY FACTOR

The greatest justices have had disproportionately distinguished
careers before they became members of the Court. John Marshall
served as secretary of state, as did Hughes between his two periods of
service on the Court. Hughes and Warren had been innovative
governors of leading states. Stone was U.S. attorney general and

38. Bryden & Flaherty, supra note 12, at 656.
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Columbia Law dean. Holmes had authored a seminal study of law and
served for two decades on the highest court of an important state.
Brandeis had earned a place in history as an effective advocate of
progressive causes. Frankfurter had won renown as a Harvard Law
professor and Washington insider. Prior to their becoming chief justices,
Hughes came within a whisker of election to the presidency, and Warren
was narrowly defeated for vice president. In contrast, the lower
echelons are replete with justices whose pre-Court careers would not
merit a footnote in any broad history of the nation-mediocre senators,
undistinguished lower court judges, forgettable attorneys general, and
wealthy corporate attorneys. Taft, Salmon P. Chase, and Thurgood
Marshall are the only figures
of non-judicial historical importance who
39
occupy these lower ranks.
With the exception of Cardozo and possibly Hughes, however, it is
unlikely that the pre-Court careers of the "great" justices influenced
their rankings. Warren, for example, would almost surely be just as
highly esteemed even if he had not been a nationally prominent
politician before his elevation to the Court, and his brilliant pre-Court
career had little lasting national historical importance. Even Holmes
and Frankfurter would be unknown except to a few legal scholars and
historians, although Holmes's scholarship would have earned him lasting
renown in intellectual history' and Frankfurter's journalistic and
political activities would have secured him a permanent niche in the
history of the Progressive movement and the New Deal. Similarly,
evaluators do not appear to have allowed their presumed esteem for
Thurgood Marshall's pre-Court career to affect their evaluation of his
performance on the Court. In some instances, however, ratings may be
affected by the non-judicial careers of the justices. As Professors
Blaustein and Mersky have pointed out, Taft's mediocre rating as a
justice may reflect the perception that he was a mediocre president, and
the ranking of Byrnes as a "failure" may be due not only to his short
39. Taft was president from 1909 to 1913, Chase had a significant political career that
included service as Secretary of the Treasury in Abraham Lincoln's Cabinet, and Marshall was
instrumental in organizing the legal challenges to segregation that culminated in Brown v.
Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
40. Although Professor Nelson believes that "[Holmes] was not a great judge" and that
"the canonization of Holmes was something that was artificially achieved by Frankfurter,"
Nelson regards Holmes as "the titanic scholar in American legal history." Transcript,supra
note 22, at 678. Nelson explains that "The Common Law remains even today ... a truly
great book, and some of his later articles, like the 'The Path of the Law,' are truly seminal
articles. Perhaps what Holmes is getting canonized for is less what he did on the bench and
more what he did off the bench." Id.
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tenure but to his post-war careers as a Cold War Secretary of State and
segregationist governor of South Carolina.4
Nevertheless, the distinction of a justice's pre-Court career does have
a bearing on the justice's distinction on the High Bench insofar as his or
her earlier experiences provide preparation for judicial service. As we
have seen, for example, the scholarship of Story, Holmes, Frankfurter,
and Cardozo immeasurably affected their performance on the Court.
Brandeis's involvement in progressive causes unquestionably enriched
his judicial perspective. Similarly, the experiences of Taft, Hughes, and
Warren in national politics provided them with invaluable experience
that helped them to navigate treacherous political shoals during periods
when the Court was highly controversial.42
There is perhaps less correlation, however, betwe6n prior judicial
service and "greatness" on the Supreme Court. Two scholars who
analyzed the rankings of the 1970 Blaustein-Mersky survey found a
generally negative correlation between a justice's ranking and prior
judicial service.43 Another scholar, after analyzing the results of the
1992 Pederson-Provizer survey and other rankings, concluded that "[i]t
may come as quite a surprise to recent presidents and their advisors, but
prior service as a state or federal judge is no guarantee of great success
on the Supreme Court."'
Of the top twenty justices on the 1993
Blaustein and Mersky list, only eight served as judges before becoming
Supreme Court justices and fewer still had significant judicial experience.
On the one hand, such luminaries as John Marshall, Brandeis, Story,
Warren, Stone, Douglas, and Frankfurter had never served as a judge.
On the other hand, one might well argue that Holmes's twenty-year
service on the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts and Cardozo's
long tenure on the New York Court of Appeals enhanced their
effectiveness as Supreme Court justices, even though the common law

41. Blaustein & Mersky, supra note 2, at 1185.
42. See ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, CHIEF JUSTICE 88-156
(1965); G. EDWARD WHITE, EARL WARREN, A PUBLIC LIFE 159-369, passim (1982); 2 J.
MERLO PUSEY, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 749-65 (1951).
43. Thomas G. Walker and William E. Hulbary, Selection of CapableJustices: Factors
to Consider, in BLAUSTEIN & MERSKY, supra note 7, at 66. These authors found that the 37
justices who had no judicial experience had an average "ability score" of 3.43; those who had
"some" experience had an average score of 3.00, and that those who had "extensive" judicial
experience had an average score of 3.03. Id.
44. Robert C. Bradley, Who Are the GreatJustices and What CriteriaDid They Meet?,
in PEDERSON & PROVIZER, supra note 2, at 9. Professor Bradley states that "[i]n considering
future Court appointees, presidents should heed the message that prior judicial experience is
not related, and is possibly an adverse influence, to superior Court performance." Id.
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cases they handled on those courts differed in many respects from the
constitutional cases that occupied their time on the Supreme Court.
The importance of prior judicial experience in predicting judicial
greatness became fraught with political controversy during the 1950s
after President Eisenhower announced that judicial experience would be
a major factor in making nominations to the Supreme Court.4' It has
remained a source of tension between proponents of judicial activism,
who generally favor the appointment of politicians and academics, and
advocates of judicial restraint, who generally perceive that prior judicial
experience makes a justice more deferential to precedent and more
sensitive to the technical nuances of the law.
Inasmuch as most justices have died in office or retired at an
advanced age, few justices have had significant careers after leaving the
bench that might influence rankings. The rankings of the few justices
who have retired in their prime-Clarke, Byrnes, Goldberg, Fortas, and
Whittaker are the only twentieth century examples-are not likely to be
enhanced by what they did after they retired from the Court.4 6 In most

instances, the service of these justices on the Court was so short and/or
their post-Court careers so insignificant that what they did after leaving
the Court is not likely to greatly affect their judicial reputation.
PROXIMITY IN TIME: THE MYOPIA FACTOR

Judicial reputation also is affected by temporal proximity. Students,
and to a lesser extent judges and scholars, are naturally inclined to
magnify the strengths and weaknesses of the reputations of justices who
served during their own times.47 Thirteen of the top fifteen justices in
45. The desire to prove that judicial experience is not an accurate indicator of the
quality of a Supreme Court justice was one of the principal reasons why Frankfurter compiled
his list in 1957 and Frank assembled his list in 1958. Id. at 7-8.
46. As we have seen, Byrnes's subsequent career may have diminished his reputation.
Clarke's role as an advocate of world peace was noble but was ineffectual and is largely
forgotten. See Carl Wittke, Mr. Justice Clarke in Retirement, 1 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 28-48
(1949). The United Nations ambassadorship for which Goldberg left the Court was shortlived, and his loss in the 1970 New York gubernatorial race and his twilight career in private
practice have not burnished his reputation. Whittaker disappeared into the obscurity of a
corporate law practice. Leon Friedman, Charles Whittaker, in THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT 1789-1969: THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS 2893, 2903-04

(Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel, eds., 1969). Fortas returned to a private practice that
lacked the high visibility of his pre-Court career. LAURA KALMAN, ABE FORTAS: A
BIOGRAPHY 379-401 (1990).
47. As one study observed, most law professors are primarily concerned with recent
issues and often are not competent to evaluate nineteenth century justices. Moreover, "the
Court's role in the twentieth century has been greater than in the nineteenth, magnifying the
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the 1993 Blaustein-Mersky survey were appointed during the twentieth
century, while only five of the next fifteen were appointed during this
century. The bottom seven justices in that survey were twentieth
century justices.
Since many of the participants in the surveys are judges, lawyers, and
law professors, rather than legal historians, it is natural that many
evaluators have a weakness for contemporary heroes. It is likely, for
example, that Brennan's fifth-place ranking in the Pederson-Provizer
survey and his seventh place ranking in the 1993 Blaustein-Mersky
survey reflect admiration for his role as the Court's leading exponent of
liberalism during the past two decades. Although Brennan seems
destined to forever remain a highly esteemed justice, it is possible that
his rankings will fall as his services pass from immediate memory.
Similarly, Rehnquist's number two rating among students in the
Pederson-Provizer survey and his number ten rating among attorneys in
that survey may be more a reflection of familiarity than enduring judicial
greatness. Although Rehnquist and Douglas are the only justices who
have served during the past two decades whom the attorneys list among
the top ten justices, the students list six such justices among their top
ten. It is noteworthy that Douglas ranks seventh in the PedersonProvizer survey of attorneys, but is absent from the student survey.
Similarly, it is interesting that Hughes, who ranked sixth in the 1970
Blaustein-Mersky survey, and Stone, who ranked eighth, fell to ninth
and twelfth place, respectively, in the 1993 update and do not appear
among the top ten justices in any of the three 1992 Pederson-Provizer
surveys. Both of these justices had served during the professional
lifetimes of many or most of the respondents to the 1970 survey, but
they were known only through history to most of the 1992 and 1993
respondents. It is also significant that Story, who ranked second in the
1970 Blaustein-Mersky survey and placed near the top of nearly all
previous surveys48 was absent from all four of the Pederson-Provizer
lists and fell to fourth place in the 1993 Blaustein-Mersky survey.
Conversely, it is noteworthy that all of the justices who ranked as
"failures" in the 1970 Blaustein-Mersky survey had served in recent
times. The bottom four-Burton, Vinson, Minton, and Whittaker-all
had left the Court between eight and seventeen years before that survey,
and the other four-Van Devanter, McReynolds, Butler, and Byrnesvirtues and vices - real or imagined - of every justice." Bryden & Flaherty, supra note 12,
at 657.
48. See PEDERSON & PROVIZER, supra note 2, at 24-28.
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-had left between twenty-eight and thirty-three years before the survey.
Since it seems unlikely that the Court only recently produced a bumper
crop of judicial duds and that none of the scores of justices who left the
Court during its first 150 years were less able than these men, the
inclusion only of recent justices among the ranks of the "failures"
suggests that historical myopia inevitably affects judicial rankings. As
we have seen, Van Devanter, McReynolds, and Butler may deserve
better, and Vinson almost certainly does.
Vinson's role in increasing the Court's activism in race cases alone
is enough to rescue him from the cellar, even though his anti-civil
libertarian role in other areas and his general lack of leadership blight
his over-all record. His third-from-the-bottom ranking in the 1970
Blaustein-Mersky survey reflects the prejudices of a generation of
scholars who compared him unfavorably with his successor, Warren. It
is noteworthy that he moved up in the 1993 update, ranking fourteenth
from the bottom. Similarly, Burton moved from fourth from the bottom
to twenty-third from the end of the list. Also, the ranking of Clarence
Thomas so near the bottom probably reflects his high visibility today.
The middle ranks of the justices in the 1970 Blaustein-Mersky survey
are populated with many justices who were less influential than Vinson,
McReynolds, Van Devanter, and Butler, as well as many who probably
were less capable than those justices and Thomas. They also were less
familiar to the evaluators, however, and those who participate in such
surveys naturally consign to the middle ranks distant justices about
whom they know and care little. There are very few scholars in the
nation, even among the first ranks of constitutional lawyers and
historians, who are intimately familiar with the records of every justice.
Indeed, some of the participants in the 1970 Blaustein-Mersky survey
admitted that they did not even recognize the names of some of the preMarshall justices.49
The passage of time may also account for the significant reversals in
the rankings of Justices Goldberg and Fortas between the 1970 and 1993
Blaustein-Mersky surveys. The ranking of Fortas fell from twenty-seven
to sixty-four, while Goldberg rose from eighty-four to fifty. Fortas, who
served for less than four years, may have been overranked at the bottom
of the "near great" category in 1970 because liberals who participated
in the 1970 survey were piqued over the Senate's failure to confirm
Fortas's nomination to the chief justiceship in 1968 and believed that

49. Blaustein & Mersky, supra note 2, at 1185.
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Fortas was unfairly forced to give up his seat in 1969. With the passage
of a quarter of a century having healed or obscured animosities that
were fresh in 1970, participants in the 1993 survey may have believed
that Fortas's time on the Court was too short to justify a "near great"
ranking, despite Fortas's solid accomplishments on the Court. Goldberg,
who also made substantial contributions during a very short tenure of
less than three years, may have risen in reputation because of fading
memories of his highly reluctant relinquishment of his seat under
pressure from Lyndon Johnson, which may have cast a pall over his
tenure in the eyes of the 1970 evaluators. Moreover, Goldberg's
advocacy of an expansive right to privacy has acquired greater significance since 1970 on account of the controversies over abortion and
homosexuality.
Once securely established, the reputation of a justice is likely to
remain stable despite the passage of time. It is noteworthy that two
significant justices, Field and Taft, remained at exactly the same place
(sixteenth and twentieth, respectively) in both the 1970 and 1993
Blaustein-Mersky surveys. Several other important justices also
remained remarkably constant: Miller fell from fifteenth to nineteenth,
Bradley from seventeenth to twenty-first, White from nineteenth to
twenty-sixth, and William Johnson from thirteenth to eighteenth; Jay
rose from twenty-eighth to twenty-fifth and Wilson from thirty-seventh
to thirty-second.
ATTENTION FROM HISTORIANS: THE CLEO FACTOR

Judicial reputations also benefit from favorable attention from
historians, as well as other scholars and members of the bar. 0 As
Richard A. Posner has observed in his study of Cardozo's reputation,
"reputation feeds on itself. Once a person is widely known, people do
not have to invest heavily to find out about him and his qualities, but
they do have to find out about a newcomer."'', Leo Pfeffer observed
in commenting upon what he regarded as the exaggeration of the

50. As Professor Gordon has observed, "'D]udicial titans' are made, not born. What's
more, they are made in the interest and reflection of their admirers." Sarah Barringer
Gordon, Commentary: The Creationof a Usable JudicialPast:Max Lerner,Class Conflict,and
the Propagationsof JudicialTitans, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 622, 622 (1995).
51. POSNER, supra note 10, at 68. Similarly, Judge Noonan has pointed out that "the
process is self-reinforcing. Once recognized as great, a judge is likely to be so recognized
again." John T. Noonan, Jr., Commentary: The Secular Search for the Sacred, 70 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 642, 642 (1995).
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importance of Marbury v. Madison," "there is nothing great or
important but historians make it so, and historians have made Marshall
great and Marbury v. Madison important."'53
Michael Kammen has pointed out that the "apotheosis" of John
Marshall was partly the result of a conscious effort by exponents of
nationalism and private property during the first two centuries of this
century to bolster support for a constitutional order that protected those
values. After a half century of relative neglect, Marshall received
widespread attention in 1901, when the American Bar Association
organized a nationwide celebration to mark the centennial of his
ascension to the chief justiceship. During the same year, James B.
Thayer of Harvard Law School published a laudatory biography.
Edward S. Corwin of Princeton published another favorable biography
during 1919, and former Senator Albert Beveridge of Indiana produced
a hagiographical four volume biography between 1916 and 1919 that
reached a wide audience. 4
Similarly, William M. Wiecek has explained how Taney's notorious
reputation was rehabilitated by the writings of Corwin, Charles Warren,
Hughes, and Frankfurter between 1911 and 1937. Long execrated as an
apologist for slavery, Taney was now portrayed as grappling more
objectively with vexing constitutional issues concerning slavery and was
lauded as the architect of the modem doctrine of the police power."
More recently, G. Edward White has described the process of what
he calls the 'canonization' of Holmes and Brandeis. White contends that
modernist commentators idealized these justices because they were the
first justices to embrace "a modernist epistemological orientation"
insofar as they rejected absolutes and believed that "humans were the
principal architects of the universe., 56 He aptly concludes that "[t]heir

52. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
53. LEO PFEFFER, THIS HONORABLE COURT: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT 85 (1965).
54. MICHAEL KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT WOULD Go OF ITSELF: THE CONSTITUTION

IN AMERICAN CULTURE 209-13 (1986).
55. William M. Wiecek, Slavery and Abolition Before the United States Supreme Court
1820-1860, 22 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 34, 34-35 (1978).
56. White, supra note 11, at 580. White points out that
[b]oth Holmes and Brandeis rejected the proposition that law was detached
from its historical or social context-a timeless, finite entity. They agreed that
at bottom judges 'made law,' that judicial decisions amounted to policy
judgements on competing policy issues, and that doctrinal and constitutional
formulas obfuscated rather than clarified the process of legal reasoning.
Id. at 616.
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continued stature testifies to the resilience of those modernist premises."' 57 Similarly, Boudin contends that Holmes and Brandeis became
legends in their own time because "they aligned themselves more than
any other two figures with the direction of constitutional history and the
needs of the country. ...

,58

Moreover, Professor Gordon contends

that influential commentators in "the liberal press" such as the journalist
Max Lerner and leading law review editors such as Abe Fortas of the
Yale Law Journalconducted a campaign during the 1930s to create "a
usable judicial past through the valorization of Holmes and Brandeis"
in order to validate their belief that a vital democracy required judicial
59
recognition of a multiplicity of competing economic interests.
Similarly, John Phillip Reid has wryly observed that "[t]he canonization of a ... Justice does not always result from a burst of sudden

revelation. Sometimes it has been the promotion of worshipful
veneration by a mixed host of scheming angels made up of any
combination of political scientists, law professors, journalists, dramatists,
and professional opinion molders."' Reid and other commentators
have pointed out that Felix Frankfurter and his students at Harvard Law
School were influential in transforming Holmes and Brandeis into
judicial icons.6'
Although the "great" justices naturally attract competent biographers, the writing of good biographies in turn helps to sustain and
nurture reputation. Holmes's reputation, like Marshall's, has been
burnished by successive generations of biographers. Already the subject
of a major biography and widespread popular and scholarly interest
during his own lifetime, Holmes became even more widely renowned
among the general public following the 1944 publication of Catherine
Drinker Bowen's best-selling Yankee From Olympus, long a staple of
book clubs. Holmes's high ranking on the 1992 Pederson-Provizer list
and his movement from fifth to second place on the Blaustein and
57. Id. at 621.
58. Transcript,supra note 22, at 679.
59. Sarah Barringer Gordon, supra note 50, at 630.
60. John Phillip Reid, Commentary: Beneath the Titans, 70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 653, 661-62
(1995).
61. Id. at 662; Transcript,supra note 22, at 679. Professor Hoffer contends that
[t]here's no question that Frankfurter was a relentless promoter, but you have to go
beyond Frankfurter. This is a Harvard Law School program, a form of Harvard Law
School's absolutely magnificent self-adoration project.... Frankfurter taught them
how to do it. That's why Holmes is canonized, not [Harlan Fiske] Stone; because
Columbia doesn't do it that well.
Id. at 681.
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Mersky list may be attributable in part to the recent publication of three
full length biographies6' and several other scholarly studies of aspects
of Holmes's career. 63
After several decades of relative indifference toward Brandeis,
biographers have produced a cornucopia of studies during recent
years.64 Meanwhile, Brandeis rose from seventh place in the 1970
Blaustein-Mersky survey to third in the 1993 update. Murphy, who
ranked seventy-seventh in the 1970 survey, shortly after a splendid but
less than laudatory biography,65 vaulted to thirty-first in 1993, after the
publication of an exhaustive and more positive account of his career.66
Similarly, the ascent of Salmon P. Chase from fifty-ninth in 1970 to
twenty-third in 1993 may reflect in part the publication in 1987 of the
first major Chase biography.67 Likewise, the ascent in Harlan II's
reputation from twenty-fifth in 1970 to tenth in the 1993 survey may
reflect the recent attention that scholars have devoted to his career.68
Finally, the high "average" ranking of the relatively obscure Justice
Peter V. Daniel in the 1970 survey may reflect the influence of John P.
Frank's 1964 biography, which praised the justices's opposition to unfair
criminal procedures, economic monopolies, and commercial exploitation

62. SHELDON M. NOvICK, HONORABLE JUSTICE: THE LIFE OF OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES (1989); LIVA BAKER, THE JUSTICE FROM BEACON HILL: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES (1991); G. EDWARD WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES: LAW AND THE INNER SELF (1993).
63. See H.L. POHLMAN, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES AND UTILITARIAN
JURISPRUDENCE (1984); MICHAEL H. HOFFHEIMER, JUSTICE HOLMES AND THE NATURAL
LAW (1992); THE LEGACY OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. (Robert W. Gordon, ed.)
(1992); JOHN S. MONOGAN, THE GRAND PANJANDRUM: MELLOW YEARS OF JUSTICE
HOLMES (1988).
64. See STEPHEN W. BASKERVILLE, OF LAWS AND LIMITATIONS: AN INTELLECTUAL
PORTRAIT OF LOUIS DEMBITZ BRANDEIS (1994); PHILIPPA STRUM, BRANDEIS: BEYOND
PROGRESSIVISM (1993); PHILIPPA STRUM, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS: JUSTICE FOR THE PEOPLE
(1984); MELVIN I. UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE TRADITION (1981);
LEWIS J. PAPER, BRANDEIS: AN INTIMATE BIOGRAPHY OF ONE OF AMERICA'S TRULY
GREAT SUPREME COURT JUSTICES (1983); LEONARD BAKER, BRANDEIS AND FRANKFURT-

ER: A DUAL BIOGRAPHY (1984); ALLON GAL, BRANDEIS OF BOSTON (1980); BEN HALPERN,
A CLASH OF HEROES: BRANDEIS, WEIZMANN, AND AMERICAN ZIONISM (1987).
65. J. WOODFORD HOWARD, JR., MR. JUSTICE MURPHY: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY

(1968).

66. SIDNEY FINE, FRANK MURPHY: THE WASHINGTON YEARS (1984). Professor Fine
also published two volumes about Murphy's pre-Court career, FRANK MURPHY, THE
DETROIT YEARS (1975) and FRANK MURPHY: THE NEW DEAL YEARS (1979).
67. FREDERICK J. BLUE, SALMON P. CHASE: A LIFE IN POLITICS (1987).
68. See YARBROUGH, supra note 19.
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of public lands.69 After Daniel receded back into obscurity, his rating
in the 1993 survey fell from thirty-second to sixty-sixth.
Conversely, the relative decline in the reputation of Charles Evans
Hughes, who fell from sixth to ninth in the Blaustein-Mersky survey and
did not appear on any of the top ten Pederson-Provizer lists, may be
attributable to a lack of interest among biographers, who have not
produced a major study in more than four decades." The absence of
any recent biographies of Stone and Wiley B. Rutledge may help to
explain why these three notable justices are beginning to pass into
obscurity. Stone, who has not been the subject of a biography since
1956,7 ' fell from eighth to twelfth between 1970 and 1993 in the
Blaustein-Mersky surveys. Rutledge, who has never received major
biographical treatment, ranked twenty-fourth in 1970, but placed only
thirty-fifth in the 1993 survey. Lack of biographical studies, however, do
not alone insure obscurity. Robert Jackson, who has never been the
subject of a major biography and has not been the subject of any serious
study since 1958,72 rose from twenty-third in the 1970 Blaustein-Mersky
survey to fifteenth in their 1993 survey.
Biographical treatment alone, however, is not likely to rehabilitate
the reputation of a poorly ranked justice. The recently published first
biography of McReynolds, for example, probably will not alter the
essentially negative verdict of historians, even though its author
generally favors McReynolds's libertarian jurisprudence and challenges
the image of McReynolds as an incorrigible misanthrope.73 Indeed, the
author admits that McReynolds was "not a great jurist" insofar as he
generally failed "to clothe his Jeffersonian views in convincing argument
and enduring language."'74
The reputation of other judges who espoused substantive due process
may benefit, however, from recent scholarship that re-evaluates the
"Lochner Era" and concludes that substantive due process was more
principled and intellectually coherent than has been supposed. In
particular, Owen Fiss's publication of a reevaluation of the Fuller Court

69. JOHN P. FRANK, JUSTICE DANIEL DISSENTING: A BIOGRAPHY OF PETER V.
DANIEL, 1784-1860 (1964).

70. The last major work was MERLO J. PUSEY, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES (1951).
71. The last major work was ALPHEUS T. MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF
THE LAw (1956).
72. EUGENE C. GERHART, AMERICA'S ADVOCATE: ROBERT H. JACKSON (1958).
73. JAMES E. BOND, I DISSENT: THE LEGACY OF CHIEF [SiC] JUSTICE JAMES CLARK

MCREYNOLDS (1992).
74. Id. at 137.
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as part of the official history of the Supreme Court may help to elevate
or least maintain the reputation of Fuller, who rose from the lower rungs
of the "average" group in the 1970 Blaustein-Mersky study to a
somewhat higher place among the "average" justices in the 1993 update.
James W. Ely, Jr.'s fine study, published in 1995, may also contribute to
his rehabilitation. 75
Although solid accomplishments are the principal requisites for
favorable biographies, justices are more likely to receive more kindly
treatment from biographers if they maintain ample documentation of
their work. The recent descent of a small army of researchers on the
Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress on the day when the
Thurgood Marshall papers were opened underscores the immense
significance of such collections. The extensive records of Holmes,
Brandeis, Taft, Frankfurter, Douglas, and Black provide a wealth of
information that helps to maintain the interest of historians in these
justices. Even though these papers sometimes reveal warts, unfavorable
attention from historians is more likely to burnish judicial reputation, at
least up to a point, than is neglect.
Justices whose papers have been lost or destroyed naturally will
suffer from neglect by historians. Edward Douglass White, for example,
might have received somewhat better than a rating of twenty-sixth in the
1993 Blaustein-Mersky survey for his twenty-six years as justice and
chief justice if all of his papers had not been destroyed. Although
White's general conservatism and his lack of brilliance are not likely to
endear him to historians, his role in helping to make the Court at least
somewhat more receptive to economic legislation and civil liberties
during the "Lochner Era" might attract more sympathetic interest from
historians if they had more raw materials with which to assess his work.
White's fall from nineteenth in the 1970 Blaustein-Mersky survey may
reflect the paucity of biographical attention. He has been the subject of
only two relatively short studies that necessarily were stunted by the lack
of archival material.76 Similarly, Field might attract more interest if his
papers were not so scarce, although it is difficult to imagine that this
proponent of substantive economic due process could ever rise much
75. See OWEN M. FIss, THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE HISTORY OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, VOL. 8, TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN
STATE, 1889-1910 (1994); JAMES W. ELY, CHIEF JUSTICE OF MELVILLE W. FULLER 1888-1910

(1995).
76. See ROBERT BAKER HIGHSAW, EDWARD DOUGLASS WHITE: DEFENDER OF THE
CONSERVATIVE FAITH (1981); MARIE CAROLYN KLINKHAMER, EDWARD DOUGLASS WHITE,
CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES (1943).
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higher than the ranking of sixteenth that he received in the 1970 and
1993 Blaustein-Mersky surveys. Even McReynolds might rise a few
notches in the estimation of historians if most of his private papers,
including virtually the entire record of his twenty-seven years on the
Court, had not been obliterated.
Extensive documentation, however, is not likely to do much good
unless it is effectively mined by historians. The Library of Congress's
massive collection of the papers of Wiley B. Rutledge, for example,
could be used to good effect by a competent biographer. The extensive
records of Hughes and Stone likewise could be tapped for modem
biographies. The use of these collections by biographers might help to
raise the ratings of both of these justices in future surveys.
Since all present and future justices are likely to retain extensive
records of their careers, historians of those justices will have a more
even-handed basis for evaluating their reputations. No longer will
reputations be so greatly diminished by a paucity of documentation or
so unduly magnified by a plethora of it. Even the reputations of present
and future justices, however, will be affected by the availability of
archival sources. A justice, for example, who conducts extensive written
correspondence, tapes his or her conversations, or maintains intimate
diaries is much more likely to receive biographical attention that will
enhance his or her reputation.
The growing media attention that justices receive also will help to
insure that no present or future justices are likely to slip into obscurity
since popular attention during a justice's own lifetime also affects
judicial reputation. Justice Douglas's much publicized athletic exploits,
environmentalism, farfiung travels, and numerous marriages and divorces
made him the most publicly visible justice during his lifetime. The
combination of a robust lifestyle, vocal championship of liberal political
causes, and libertarian jurisprudence transformed him into something of
a folk hero. His visibility during his own time may help to explain why
he remains on most top-ten lists even though scholars increasingly
question the durability of his contributions. The attention that Sandra
Day O'Connor has received as the Court's first female justice may help
to explain why students ranked her third in the Pederson-Provizer
survey.

77

77. PEDERSON & PROVIZER, supra note 2, at 17. Respondents to the 1993 BlausteinMersky survey placed her only at thirty-third. Blaustein & Mersky, supra note 2.
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Finally, it is possible that the reputations of some justices benefit
from mere notoriety because it rescues them from obscurity. John
Rutledge, for example, stood near the top of the "average" group,
within shooting distance of the "near great" category, in the 1970
Blaustein-Mersky survey, even though he served on the Court for only
two years, contributed almost nothing during that short period, and
failed to obtain confirmation as chief justice. The Senate's defeat of
Rutledge's nomination, however, is well known among scholars and
received special attention after the defeats of the Haynsworth nomination late in 1969 and the Carswell nomination early in 1970, just before
the survey was taken. This may have given him a visibility that
contributed to his high ranking. Despite the attention that Rutledge
received in more recent years in the spate of articles written in the wake
of renewed controversy over the Supreme Court nomination process,
however, his ranking fell to seventy-second in 1993.
ECCENTRIC DECISIONS: THE DRED SCOrr FACrOR

Lawyers, judges, and even scholars may have a tendency to base
their opinion of a justice on a few of the justice's best known opinions
and dissents, particularly when the justice is remote in time, rather than
upon a careful study of the justice's overall judicial record. In most
instances, however, little harm is done since a justice's most dramatic
decisions generally are consistent with his or her over-all performance
on the Court.
Although judicial reputations naturally suffer from decisions that are
widely regarded as wrong-headed, critics of the justices seem generally
willing to accord a high reputation to justices who have handed down
such decisions that seem inconsistent with the justice's overall record.78
The most notable example is Taney, who, until recently, had consistently
received high rankings despite universal execration of his Dred Scott
decision. 79 Growing sensitivity toward the racial implications of this
blot on his record, however, may explain why he fell from third place to
twenty-ninth between 1970 and 1993 in the Blaustein-Mersky surveys

78. As one scholar has pointed out, however, "[t]he aberration theory.., is problematic
in assessing the greatness of any justice, for one assumes that the author himself did not
regard any one opinion, no matter how despicable or unsatisfactory later generations may find
it, as eccentric and somehow not really 'his."' Kenneth M. Holland, Roger B. Taney: A
Great ChiefJustice?, in PEDERSON & PROVIZER, supra note 2, at 75.
79. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
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and why he failed to appear on the Pederson-Provizer list,8" despite his
consistently high rankings in all previous lists of great justices. 8' One
scholar, however, has argued recently that the opinion of Taney in Dred
Scott "is the true warrant for his inclusion in the national pantheon"
since he so boldly asserted the Court's power in that decision.'
Moreover, lawyers and historians continue to recognize Taney's
significant contributions to the development of American law during the
mid-nineteenth century and to admire many of his decisions on subjects
other than slavery, particularly those decisions that fostered economic
development.8 3 Professor Finkelman contends, however, that
[i]n the end Taney must always be remembered more for Dred
Scott than his opinions about the economy. Dred Scott indeed,
has come to stand for all that can go wrong in a Supreme Court
decision, and all that did go wrong under the pro-slavery
Constitution. It remains the most infamous decision in American
constitutional history, and it author suffers accordingly....
However we may admire Taney's personal grace, his clever
opinions on commercial issues, and his sometimes brilliant
analysis of constitutional issues, his racism, pro-slavery dogmatism, and secessionist sentiments will remain his legacy. Whenever the name of Taney comes up, there will always be the echo of
hooting.' 4

'80. Although Taney did not place among the top justices on the final Pederson-Provizer
list, he ranked ninth among attorneys who participated in that survey. PEDERSON &
PROVIZER, supra note 2, at 16.
81. Felix Frankfurter ranked Taney fourth in his 1957 survey of justices, John Frank
ranked him fifth in 1958, George Currie placed him fourth in 1964, Stuart Nagel ranked him
fourth in 1970, and James E. Hambleton placed him third in 1983. Id. at 24-28.
82. Holland, supra note 78, at 94-95. Contrary to the widespread contention that
Taney's decision helped bring the Court into such widespread disrepute that the Court did
not recover its power for decades to come, Professor Holland argues that Taney "set in
motion a trend that resulted in an explosion of judicial policymaking in the 1870s and 1880s
that has continued to the present." Id. at 76. Holland contends that the Court in Dred Scott
"became a major player in the legislative process, and neither the Court nor the nation have
looked back since." Id. at 94.
83. Paul Finkelman, Hooted Down the Page of History: Reconsideringthe Greatness of
Chief Justice Taney, 1994 J. SuPREME Cr. HIsT. 83, 98-99.
84. Id at 100. Professor Finkelman has explained how Taney's reputation suffered from
the time of Dred Scott throughout most of the remainder of the nineteenth century. Id at
83-84. During the early twentieth century, Taney's reputation improved, both as the result
of a recrudescence of racial discrimination and because Taney's support of "the right of the
states to regulate their economics without federal interference or supervision" was popular
among Progressives and early New Dealers. Id. at 84-85. Finkelman points out that Taney
"seemed almost Brandeisian" in his "economic federalism" and demonstrates how Felix
Frankfurter, while a law professor, vigorously worked to rehabilitate Taney's reputation. Id.
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Similarly, Bradley's authorship of a notorious opinion upholding
denial of admission of a woman to the bar solely on account of
gender85 did not prevent him from attaining high rankings in the 1970
and 1993 Blaustein-Mersky surveys. Growing sensitivity about gender
issues during the past two decades, however, may account in part for his
fall from seventeenth to twenty-first.
In some instances, scholars and commentators have magnified the
ideologically attractive aspects of the justices that they have admired and
overlooked or minimized those characteristics that they found less
congenial. The most notable example of the willingness of critics to
overlook judicial shortcomings is Holmes. As numerous scholars have
pointed out, Holmes's reputation for enlightenment is blighted by his
votes to sustain laws for the sterilization the mentally handicapped,86
the prohibition on the teaching of foreign languages,' and peonage. 8
Holmes's espousal of judicial positions that would be unpopular with
most persons today, however, has not tarnished the lustre of his
reputation.
In explaining the process by which Holmes and Brandeis were
elevated to "the status of professional and cultural icons" during the
1930s,8' G. Edward White has pointed out that commentators "emphasized their occasional dissents and ignored the more numerous instances
in which they joined Taft, Van Devanter, McReynolds, Sutherland, and
Butler in extending and refining the categories of orthodox earlytwentieth century jurisprudence."9 White explains that students of the
Court have 'canonized' Holmes and Brandeis in spite of these shortcomings because they were the first justices to adopt a modernist philosophy
of jurisprudence."

at 85-86.
85. Bradwell v. Illinois 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873).
86. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
87. Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 412 (1923) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
88. Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 245 (1911) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
89. White, supra note 11, at 576.
90. Id. at 578.
91. Id. Judge Noonan, however,
would place the secret of their appeal elsewhere: in the spareness, trenchancy, and
vigor of Holmes's style, the Jamesian complexity of his personal affairs, and his
adamant assertion of his own responsibility as a judge; and in the patient marshalling
of reasons in a Brandeis opinion, the concentrated force of the analysis, the calm,
uncompromising laying bare of the issues, combined with the passion for service and
the sense of personal responsibility that he, the first Jewish Justice, brought to his
work.
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Although many of Holmes's opinions might disappoint his admirers,
there is at least a substantial body of law upon which to base his
reputation as a judicial modernist. The same cannot be said of the first
Justice Harlan, whose glowing reputation is based largely upon his status
as the sole dissenter in Plessy v. Ferguson.2 As Professor White has
observed, Harlan "was transformed by commentators from an eccentric
to a visionary" during the Civil Rights Revolution.93 Similarly, John
Phillip Reid has observed with regard to Harlan that "[s]tandards have
changed since the canonization of Holmes and Brandeis. Legal
academics now need only one dissent to nominate a candidate for
sainthood."94
Conversely, occasional decisions that are widely lauded today often
are not enough to substantially improve the reputations of justices who
have made themselves unpopular through the balance of their record.
Perhaps the most notable example is McReynolds, who ranked sixth
from the bottom in 1970 and is widely regarded as a "failure" despite his
authorship of a triad of opinions during the 1920s that broke new
frontiers in civil liberties by upholding the rights of private schools
against racial and religious bigots who sought to significantly curtail or
destroy private education.95
Nevertheless, a well regarded opinion by an otherwise obscure justice
may sometimes help him to emerge from the ranks of the non-entities
and obtain a ranking that may not be warranted by his overall record.
The classic example is Benjamin R. Curtis, who ranked second in the
"near great" category in the 1970 Blaustein-Mersky survey. Although
Curtis, who served for only six years during the 1850s, made some useful
contributions in commercial cases and wrote the majority opinion in
Cooley v. Board of Wardens,96 his reputation probably is based largely
upon his dissent in Dred Scott. While this dissent and his other work
during his brief tenure on the Court were highly important and suggest
John T. Noonan, Jr. Commentary: The Secular Search for the Sacred, 70 N.Y. U. L. Rev. 642,
652 (1995).
92. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
93. White,supra note 11, at 576.
94. John Phillip Reid, Commentary: Beneath the Titans, 70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 653, 664
(1995).
95. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (striking down laws that restricted the
teaching of foreign languages in private and parochial schools); Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510 (1925) (striking down law that required all elementary school age children to
attend a public school); Farrington v. Tokushige 273 U.S. 284 (1927) (striking down law aimed
at restricting Asian-American schools in Hawaii).
96. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1852).
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that Curtis would have achieved real greatness if his service had not
been cut short, they do not necessarily entitle him to a higher ranking
than justices whose total contributions and influence were greater.
Similarly, Ward Hunt's dissent in United States v. Reese97 may help
to explain why he placed in the middle of the "average" category in the
1970 Blaustein-Mersky survey, despite his dismal record on race in other
cases and his cramped view of federal power during his brief tenure of
nine years (only six of them active) on the Court. 98 Likewise, William
Strong's decisions in Strauder v. West Virginia99 and Ex parte Virginia1°° may explain why he received a similar ranking even though these
are the exceptions to a short ten year tenure that was more notable for
narrow reading of the civil rights laws and opposition to regulation of
business. Finally, Sutherland's opinion in Powell v. Alabama,1 '
requiring a right to counsel in capital cases, may help explain why he is
ranked as a near great even though he was a proponent of a less popular
form of judicial activism in cases involving economic regulation.
PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS: THE INTEGRITY FACTOR

Personal traits also affect judicial reputation, and indeed this is a
criterion that respondents to the Pederson-Provizer survey listed as one
of the factors they used to identify a justice as "great." Charles Fairman
believed that in evaluating judicial greatness, "we look first to integrity.""1 2 Since judicial ranking is an inherently subjective process, the
importance of personal traits should not be underestimated. As Posner
has observed, "[h]igh achievers tend not to be likable; when they are, we
like them all the more and extend some of our favor to the work
itself."1 0
The warmth and decency of Warren, the integrity and sensitivity of
Cardozo, and the charming eccentricities of Holmes have contributed to
their renown. On the other hand, the public remoteness of Hughes, who

97. 92 U.S. 214, 238 (1876) (Hunt, J., dissenting from invalidation of penal section of
statute enforcing the right of citizens to vote).
98. His well known dissent in Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 715, 736 (1878) also may have
enhanced his reputation.
99. 100 U.S. 303 (1880) (holding that state law that excluded African Americans from
juries violated the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause).
100. 100 U.S. 339 (1880) (upholding the section of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 which
prohibited racial discrimination in the selection of juries).
101. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
102. Fairman, supra note 4, at 83.
103. POSNER, supra note 51, at 130.

1996]

THE RATINGS GAME

was described in his lifetime as an icicle with a beard, may help to
explain his growing obscurity. The incorrigible enmity of McReynolds
toward Jews, African Americans, and women has forever blighted his
reputation, assuring the low rankings from which his occasional defenses
of personal liberties might otherwise have rescued him.
Similarly, the reputation of Butler may have suffered from the
perception that he was a bully who hectored anyone who failed to
subscribe to his rugged individualism. Butler's role in purging the
University of Minnesota faculty of political dissidents during his years
as a trustee continues to haunt his reputation."° In contrast, Sutherland's relatively sunny personality may help to explain why he was
ranked as a "near great" in the 1970 Blaustein-Mersky survey and
"average" in the 1993 update while his three less personable fellow
Horsemen were ranked as "failures" even though Sutherland's record
was not notably more liberal than theirs. Richard A. Posner believes
that "[e]mphasis on personality has done unwarranted damage to the
reputation of Felix Frankfurter, an extremely accomplished judge,"'"5
who fell from eleventh in the 1970 Blaustein-Mersky survey to fourto
teenth in their 1993 survey. Posner explains that "[w]e find it 10hard
6
accept that jerk and genius are often found in the same body."'
The extent to which justices have led exciting or interesting lives may
also contribute to their reputation, even when the incidents that make
more for a savory biography have little or nothing to do with the
justice's legal career. Justice Douglas's much-publicized exploits as an
outdoorsman and an environmentalist, and even perhaps his four
marriages to progressively younger women, may have given him a
public visibility that has burnished his judicial reputation. Similarly,
Oliver Wendell Holmes's dramatic experiences as a twice-wounded
soldier in the Civil War probably helped to contribute to what G.
Edward White has called Holmes's "canonization."' 10 7
Since few justices have had much spice in their lives, those whose
lives have had dramatic incidents naturally are likely to attract more
attention and command higher ratings. Thomas C. Grey has pointed
out, however, that "judges are (and should be) generally conventional

104. See John T. Hubbell, A Question of Academic Freedom: The William A. Schaper

Case, 17 MIDWEST Q. 11-21 (1976); DAVID J. DANELSKI, A SUPREME COURT JUSTICE IS
APPOINTED 100-05, 197-99 (1964).
105. Posner, supra note 8, at 513.
106. Id.
107. White, supra note 11, at 595.
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people whose lives do not make good stories."'" Similarly, Posner
contends that "[f]ew judges, however prominent, have been extraordinary individuals; few have led interesting lives.. .

.""

Although one

might argue that one can hardly dismiss as dull any life spent shaping
the law and public policy, it is true that few judges have had unusual
experiences outside of their official careers and that too unconventional
a life might under some circumstances deprive a judge of the balance
that is critical to a judicial temperament.
The greatest justices also have been regarded as persons of high
integrity. As Posner observed in his study of Cardozo's reputation,
"[c]haracter is important to a judicial reputation because in dealing with
the work of judges we inevitably must take much on faith." ' ° The
obvious diligence, conscientiousness, and sincerity of justices such as
Cardozo, Brennan, both Harlans, Warren, Brandeis, and Black, as well
as their essential desire to do justice, has clearly contributed to their
reputations.
Moreover, Supreme Court justices have been remarkably free from
scandal."' They have almost entirely escaped (fairly, one hopes) the
financial, sexual, and ethical imbroglios that have sullied the reputations
of many presidents and members of Congress, as well as countless state
judges, executives, and legislators. The most lurid stories about justices
involve senility and physical infirmities, natural occupational hazards of
a lifetime post."' Even the most popular and extravagant backstairs

108. Thomas C. Grey, Commentary: UnrepeatableLessons, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 524,526
(1995).
109. Richard A. Posner, JudicialBiography, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 505, 512 (1995).
110. POSNER, supra note 51, at 131-32.
111. Professor Fairman observed in 1950 that "in the primary sense of being
uncorrupted, every Justice of the Supreme Court seems to have had integrity." Fairman
believed that "integrity" was the "most fundamental of all the requirements" of a great judge.
Fairman, supra note 4, at 83. Not everyone, however, has agreed that the Justices have not
been corrupt. Early in the century, for example, the socialist journalist Gustavus Myers
published a lengthy study of constitutional history that purported to reveal that economic
ideologies and financial conflicts of interest had significantly biased many of the Justices.
GUSTAVUS MYERS, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (reprinted
1968) (1912).
112. See David N. Atkinson, The Problemsof DisabledJustices: Supreme Court Deaths
and Resignations 1865-1900, 38 DRAKE L. REV. 903-25 (1988-89); Merlo J. Pusey, The Court
Copes With Disability,YEARBOOK SUPREME COURT HISTORICAL SOCIETY 63-69, 100 (1979);
John S. Goff, Old Age and the Supreme Court,4 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 95-106 (1960).
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study of the justices, The Brethren, portrays an exceptionally honorable
group of public officials."'
Fortas is the only justice who has resigned from the Court in the
wake of widespread questions about personal misconduct, which was
relatively insignificant, if indeed there was any at all." 4 Attacks on the
integrity of justices during their tenure on the Court have been rare,
generally motivated by politics, and have left no blot on the reputations
of those justices. The 1970 investigation of Douglas by Republican
members of Congress, for example, failed to discredit Douglas and the
few possible ethical lapses that it uncovered have not seriously
blemished Douglas's reputation. Similarly, Taft emerged unscathed from
1923 attacks by socialists and other leftists who charged that he
improperly accepted an annuity under the will of Andrew Carnegie."'
Neither has there emerged any serious posthumous revelations about
improper judicial conduct. Bruce Allen Murphy's 1982 book about the
surprising scope of the extrajudicial activities of Brandeis raises serious
questions about the propriety of judicial participation in non-judicial
public affairs, but it is not likely to diminish the reputation of either
Brandeis or Frankfurter, who before going on the Court, assisted
Brandeis in his far flung political activities." 6
ADMINISTRATIVE SKILLS: THE DRUDGE FACTOR

Administrative ability, while not usually cited among the bases for
ranking justices, is a legitimate criterion. It is, of course, primarily
relevant to chief justices, on whom the most significant administrative
burdens fall. Since the chief justice is the head of the federal judicial
administration and not merely primus inter pares among the justices, it
is not unfair to allow the chief justice's broader duties to influence his
judicial ranking. Some justices, notably Taft and Burger, have devoted
far more energy to administration of the federal judiciary than have
other justices. Scholars accord Taft and Burger nearly unanimous
plaudits for their untiring efforts to improve the fairness and efficiency
of the federal judicial system. The administrative talents of these chief
113.

BOB WOODWARD & ScoTri ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME

COURT (1979).

114. See generally, BRUCE A. MURPHY, FORTAS: THE RISE AND RUIN OF A SUPREME
COURT JUSTICE (1988).
115. See WILLIAM G. Ross, A MUTED FURY: POPULISTS, PROGRESSIVES, AND LABOR
UNIONS CONFRONT THE COURTS, 1890-1937, at 234-40 (1994).
116. BRUCE A. MURPHY, THE BRANDEIS/FRANKFURTER CONNECTION: THE SECRET
ACTIVITIES OF TWO SUPREME COURT JUSTICES (1982).
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justices clearly have helped raise their rankings among scholars, who
generally have been cool toward their conservative jurisprudence and
have not thought highly of their intellectual abilities. It is significant
that the judges in the Pederson-Provizer survey were the only one of the
four groups in that survey to place Taft among the top ten justices.
Judges perhaps have more appreciation of the importance of efficient
judicial administration.
EXTRA-JUDICIAL ACTIVITIES: THE GLOBETROTrER FACTOR

Although not generally cited as a criterion in ranking justices, extrajudicial activities during the period of service on the Court may properly
be taken into account in measuring judicial reputations since virtually
everything that a justice does reflects on the Court. Since tradition
frowns upon such activities, justices who undertake extrajudicial work
are placing themselves in a parlous position. The two most notable
examples of significant outside activities by justices-Warren's chairing
of the commission that investigated the assassination of President
Kennedy and Jackson's absence from the Court for a year to serve as
head prosecutor of Nazi war crimes at the Nuremberg trials-involved
those justices in controversies that have not helped to burnish their
reputations.
INFLUENCE AND LEADERSHIP ON THE COURT: THE PERSUASION

FACTOR
A justice's ability to influence his or her associates and to build
consensus on the Court often is cited by scholars and judges as an
attribute of judicial greatness. The ability to bring harmony to the Court
and to unite querulous associates on the great issues of the day is widely
regarded as a particularly admirable attribute for a chief justice. It is
therefore not surprising that John Marshall, who has been ranked first
in literally every known survey, is famous for his ability to impose his
will on his colleagues and to make the Court in many cases speak with
one voice. Marshall's accomplishment in promoting Federalist ideals is
particularly remarkable since all of his colleagues, in time, were
appointed by Republican presidents. Earl Warren's powers in this
regard were particularly formidable-his success in obtaining unanimity
in Brown v. Board of Education is the classic example-and this
accounts in large measure for Warren's high rankings. Conversely,
scholars often have faulted Chief Justice Vinson for failing to promote
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judicial harmony, which contributes to Vinson's relatively low rankings
despite the many important decisions in which he participated.
Leadership and influence are also important to the reputations of
associate justices. Murphy's reputation, for example, has suffered from
the perception that he was unduly influenced by Black and Douglas,
even though his liberal votes would be likely to appeal to many survey
participants. Similarly, the reputation of another "liberal," Thurgood
Marshall, has suffered from the perception that he had little intellectual
or political influence over his colleagues.
On the whole, however, there does not appear to be a particularly
strong correlation between influence and consensus building and high
rankings. On the contrary, those who rank judges seem particularly to
admire "great dissenters" who went their own way on the Court. Of the
top ten justices in the Pederson-Provizer survey, as many as seven are
notable more for their dissents than for their ability to forge majorities.
Three of the ten-Holmes, Brandeis, and Harlan I-have reputations
that are built largely upon their dissents in famous cases. On important
issues, all three of these justices, particularly Holmes and Brandeis,
swam against the tide of their times and had little apparent success in
making converts among their brethren on the Court. Four other
justices-Brennan, Black, Douglas, and Frankfurter-were more often
in the majority in great cases but are perhaps more renowned for their
many dissents than for their participation in majority decisions.
Although Brennan and Black may have had significant influence over
some of their colleagues on some important issues, Douglas was
notorious for his lack of interest in persuading colleagues to join him,
and Frankfurter became notorious for the failure of his prodigious
efforts to influence colleagues.
The so-called "great dissenters" nevertheless tend to receive high
rankings because they so often have influenced future generations if not
their own colleagues. Harlan I and Holmes are classic examples. More
recent dissenters, such as Brennan, may have benefitted from the
perception that they are likely to influence future generations, or at least
that their intellectually trenchant dissents have influenced scholars and
have articulated a significant point of view.
Conversely, the evaluators have not assigned high ranks to justices
who have failed to influence future generations even though they
influenced the outcome of decisions in their own times. Many of the
lower ranked justices were powerful because theirs were the "swing"
votes in many close decisions. Such power, however, does not appear
to have burnished their reputations. Justice Roberts, for example, was
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consigned to the lower echelons of the "average" category in the 1970
Blaustein-Mersky survey and no higher than the upper levels of that
category in 1993 even though his "switch in time" in 1937 triggered the
Judicial Revolution of that year and signalled a major shift in the Court.
Similarly, Justices Stewart and White were near the bottom of the
"average" category in the 1970 survey even though they often cast the
deciding votes in Warren Court cases. Justice Powell is unlikely to
receive many plaudits for his central position during the Burger years,
although the good sense of his opinions appear to have won him many
admirers and he ranked a respectable twenty-second in the 1970
Blaustein-Mersky survey.
Those who evaluate justices are likely to give credit for being a swing
vote only if the justice was able to carry other justices with him. For
example, Hughes may benefit from the belief that he succeeded in
persuading some of his more moderate colleagues, including Roberts,
from voting against social reform legislation during the 1930s.
Moreover, a justice may actually suffer from casting important
deciding votes if he votes in a manner of which the evaluators disapprove. Professors Blaustein and Mersky have pointed out that
Whittaker's reputation has suffered because he "cast the deciding vote
in forty-one crucial decisions-each time standing on the side that would
deny civil rights or the extension of liberty.""1 7
QUALITY AND QUANTITY OF OPINIONS: THE LITERARY FACTOR

Closely related to a justice's influence is his ability to express himself
clearly and forcefully in his writings. Attorneys and students in the
Pederson-Provizer survey mentioned "writing ability" more frequently
than any other attribute as a criteria for greatness, while scholars ranked
it second only to intellectual ability, and judges ranked it fourth, after
intellectual ability, leadership, and impact on the law. 8 Richard A.
Posner has aptly observed that "literary distinction is a central element
in the reputation of the great judges, such as Holmes, Cardozo, and
Hand." 119

All of the great justices have been noted for the quality and quantity
of their judicial opinions. Several, particularly Brandeis and Cardozo,

117. Blaustein and Mersky, supra note 2, at 1187.
118. PEDERSON & PROVIZER, supra note 2, at 20.
119. Posner, supra note 8, at 512-13.
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are remembered as great stylists." ° Despite the opacity of some of his
writing, Holmes also is regarded as a great stylist and author of many
famous epigrams. Although Warren and John Marshall are not
their most significant opinions
renowned for the elegance of their prose,
121
force.
and
power
with
were written
Robert C. Post contends that Holmes and Brandeis are more highly
regarded than Stone, even though Post believes that Stone was the
"most modernist" justice of the 1920s, because "Holmes and Brandeis
simply write better and smarter opinions than their contemporaries.
Their work glows with competence and mastery and style. It leaps off
the page, in part because it points so directly to what modem eyes view
as essential.""z
Scholars have often correlated judicial ability with the number of
opinions produced by a judge. Blaustein and Mersky, for example,
found that the nineteen most prolific opinion writers included six of the
twelve "great" justices in their 1970 survey, five of the fifteen "neargreat justices," seven of the fifty-five "average" justices, and one of the
fourteen below-average justices and judicial failures.'2
Quality may be correlated with quantity, moreover, because judges
who are competent writers generally like to write, are more willing to
120. During Cardozo's tenure on the New York Court of Appeals, Frankfurter
remarked that "[t]he bar reads his opinions for pleasure, and even a disappointed litigant must
feel, when Judge Cardozo writes, that a cause greater than his private interest prevailed."
Felix Frankfurter, When Judge Cardozo Writes, in FELIX FRANKFURTER ON THE SUPREME
COURT. EXTRAJUDICIAL ESSAYS ON THE COURT AND CONSTITUTION 245 (Phillip B.
Kurland, ed., 1970) (reprinted from NEw REPUBLIC, Apr. 8, 1931).
121. Praising Marshall's prose, Cardozo stated that "We hear the voice of the law
speaking by its consecrated ministers with the calmness and assurance that are born of a sense
of mastery and power. Thus Marshall seemed to judge, and a hush falls upon us even now
as we listen to his words. Those organ tones of his were meant to fill cathedrals .... We
feel the mystery and the awe of inspired revelation." BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, LAw AND
LITERATURE 10-11 (1931). Although Professor Schwartz has acknowledged that Warren
"does not rank with Holmes or Cardozo as a master of the quotable phrase," he aptly points
out that "his important opinions have a simple power of their own; if they do not resound
with the cathedral tones of a Marshall, they speak with the moral decency of a Modern
Micah." Schwartz, supra note 1, at 437-38.
122. Transcript,supra note 22, at 681.
123. Professors Blaustein and Mersky, for example, found that the nineteen most prolific
opinion writers included six of the twelve "great" justices in the 1970 survey, five of the
fifteen "near-great" justices, seven of the fifty-five "average" justices, and one of the fourteen
"below-average" justices and judicial "failures". BLAUSTEIN & MERSKY, supranote 7, at 10102. In their wry attempts to identify "the most insignificant justice," Professors Currie and
Easterbrook placed much emphasis on the number of opinions written. Currie, supra note
1, at 469-73; Easterbrook, supra note 27, at 487, 495-96. See also Atkinson, supra note 18, at
349-50.
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write, and are more likely to be assigned to write opinions in significant
cases. A judge who is not a prolific writer, however, is not necessarily
without influence. Professor Langran, for example, has pointed out that
Van Devanter's ranking as a "failure" may be related to the paucity of
his written output, but that this may not be a fair measurement of his
significance since he was influential during conferences and "left a lot of
the opinion writing to Justice Sutherland ... "124
The importance of quantity should not be greatly emphasized,
however. As Felix Frankfurter observed, "precious wines are not drunk
out of beer mugs, and significant, original, and enduring judicial work is
not measured by the pound."'" Although Professor Mersky has found
a distinct correlation between the number of opinions that a justice has
written and his ranking in his 1970 survey, he concluded that it is not
significant insofar as it is more closely related to the longevity of tenure
that characterizes the justices who receive high rankings."2 Similarly,
Professor Atkinson has observed that "longevity of service is apt to be
signally important" in considering opinion output as a status criterion.
He points out that signed opinions therefore assume an added importance for the "vast majority of Justices whose tenures are neither overly
long nor unduly short.... 5"127
Unfortunately, the quality and quantity of writing may become a
more difficult and problematic factor in evaluating judicial reputations
as justices continue to delegate more work to their law clerks. As
Richard A. Posner has observed, "[i]ncreasingly, judicial output is a
corporate affair (it always was in a more limited sense, because of the
heavy reliance that most judges place on the briefs of the parties). The
biographies of modem judges may come to resemble histories of
General Motors or the New York Public Library."'"

124. Langran, supra note 13, at 8. Similarly, Professor Atkinson believes that "his
performance in conference, where he was invariably well-informed and verbal, added a
needed dimension to the Taft Court" and that his "expertise in federal jurisdiction and
procedure, along with his general acumen, permitted him to contribute significantly to the
Supreme Court despite his seeming inability to fashion opinions." Atkinson, supra note 18,
at 354.
125. Felix Frankfurter to Harlan Fiske Stone, June 2, 1937, Felix Frankfurter Papers,
Series 3, Reel 3 (on file with author).
126. BLAUSTEIN & MERSKY, supra note 7, at 101-02.
127. Atkinson, supra note 18, at 349.
128. Posner, supra note 8, at 513.
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CONCLUSION

Judicial reputations are the products of many circumstances, and
greatness may manifest itself in different ways among different
justices. 29 Both internal and external factors affect the renown of the
justices. The greatest of them have shared formidable internal qualities,
including powerful intellects, writing talents, abundant energy, pleasing
personalities, and the ability to influence their fellow justices and future
generations of jurists. These traits do not alone make great reputations,
however, for judicial renown is heavily influenced by three external
factors: longevity of tenure, the ideological predilections of those who
evaluate the justices, and proximity in time.
Of these three external factors, longevity of tenure is perhaps the
most crucial element since nearly all of the "great" justices have enjoyed
lengthy tenures on the Court and could not have attained such renown
if their tenures had been significantly curtailed. All of the great justices
also have espoused a judicial philosophy that "liberal" evaluators might
find congenial. Although ideology helps to account for the selection of
the "great" justices as well as the "failures," there are independent
variables that help to explain why justices who have defended civil
liberties have great reputations. Finally, although evaluators tend to
exaggerate the strengths and weaknesses of the more recent justices, a
significant number of temporally distant justices remain in the upper
ranks.
Although judicial reputations wax and wane, there is a remarkable
level of uniformity among different surveys that have been conducted
during the past half century. The similarities between the results of the
1970 and 1993 Blaustein-Mersky surveys are particularly striking.
Although this stability in part reflects a consensus among academicians
about what makes judicial greatness, the Pederson-Provizer survey
demonstrates that scholars, judges, and lawyers tend to identify the same
justices as "great," although students had a considerably different list.

129. As Frankfurter observed, "greatness may manifest itself through the power of
penetrating analysis exerted by a trenchant mind, as in the case of Bradley; it may be due to
long persistence in a point of view forcefully expressed over a long judicial stretch, as shown
by Field; it may derive from a coherent judicial philosophy, expressed with pungency and
brilliance, reinforced by the Zeitgeist .. .as was true with Holmes; it may be achieved by the
resourceful deployment of vast experience and an originating mind, as illustrated by Brandeis;
it may result from the influence of a singularly endearing personality in the service of sweet
reason, as Cardozo proves; it may come through the kind of vigor that exerts moral authority
over others, as embodied in Hughes." Frankfurter, supra note 1, at 784.

444
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While the uniformity of the surveys helps to validate their reliability
as indicators of the opinions of students of the Court, the changes in the
reputations of various justices over time reflect shifts in attitudes toward
the role of the Supreme Court in American society. These changes
provide a barometer of trends in historiography and offer insights into
the type of persons whom Americans would like to see appointed to the
Court in the future.
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II - RESULTS OF THE 1970 SURVEY BY PROFESSORS
ROY A. MERSKY & ALBERT P. BLAUSTEIN

John Marshall
Joseph Story
Roger B. Taney
John M. Harlan
Oliver W. Holmes, Jr.,
Charles E. Hughes
Louis D. Brandeis
Harlan F. Stone
Benjamin N. Cardozo
Hugo L. Black
Felix Frankfurter
Earl Warren
William Johnson
Benjamin R. Curtis
Samuel F Miller
Stephen J. Field
Joseph P. Bradley
Morrison R. Waite
Edward D. White
William H. Taft
George Sutherland
William 0. Douglas
Robert H. Jackson
Wiley B. Rutledge
John Harlan II
William J. Brennan, Jr.,
Abe Fortas
John Jay
John Rutledge
William Cushing
James Wilson
John Blair
James Iredell
William Paterson
Samuel Chase
Oliver Ellsworth
Bushrod Washington
Brockholst Livingston

1801-1835
1811-1845
1836-1864
1877-1911
1902-1932
1910-1916 & 1930-1941
1916-1939
1925-1946
1932-1938
1937-1971

1939-1962
1953-1969
1804-1834
1851-1857
1862-1890
1863-1897
1870-1892
1874-1888

1911-1921
1921-1930
1922-1938
1939-1975
1941-1954
1943-1949
1955-1971
1956-1990

1965-1969
1789-1795
1789-1791; 1795
1789-1810
1789-1798
1789-1796

1790-1799
1793-1806

1796-1811
1796-1799
1798-1829
1806-1823
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APPENDIX
Thomas Todd
Gabriel Duvall
Smith Thompson
John McLean
Henry Baldwin
James M. Wayne
John Catron
John McKinley
Peter V. Daniel
Samuel Nelson
Levi Woodbury
Robert C. Grier
John Campbell
Nathan Clifford
Noah H. Swayne
David Davis
Salmon P. Chase
William Strong
Ward Hunt
Stanley Matthews
Horace Gray
Samuel Blatchford
Lucius Q.C. Lamar
Melville W. Fuller
David J. Brewer
Henry B. Brown
George Shiras, Jr.
Rufus W. Peckham
Joseph McKenna
William R. Day
William H. Moody
Horace H. Lurton
Joseph R. Lamar
Mahlon Pitney
John H. Clarke
Edward T. Sanford
Owen J. Roberts

II-

CONT.

1807-1826
1812-1835
1823-1843
1829-1861
1830-1844
1835-1867
1837-1865
1837-1852
1841-1860
1845-1872
1845-1851
1846-1870
1853-1861
1858-1881
1862-1881
1862-1877
1864-1873
1808-1895
1873-1882
1881-1889
1882-1902
1882-1893
1888-1893
1888-1910

1890-1910
1891-1906
1892-1903

1896-1909
1898-1925
1903-1922

1906-1910
1910-1914
1911-1916
1912-1922
1916-1922
1923-1930
1930-1945
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Stanley F Reed
Frank Murphy
Tom C. Clark
Potter Stewart
Byron R. White
Arthur J. Goldberg
Thurgood Marshall
Thomas Johnson
Alfred Moore
Robert Trimble
Philip P. Barbour
William B. Woods
Howell E. Jackson
Willis Van Devanter
James C. McReynolds
Pierce Butler
James F. Byrnes
Harold H. Burton
Fred M. Vinson
Sherman Minton
Charles Whittaker

II -

CONT.

1935-1957
1940-1949
1949-1967
1958-1981
1962-1993
1962-1965
1967-1991
1791-1793
1799-1804
1826-1828
1836-1841
1881-1887
1893-1895
1911-1937
1914-1941
1922-1939
1941-1942
1945-1958
1946-1953
1949-1956
1957-1962
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